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COUNTERING PERSONALIZED SPEECH
Leon G. Ho*
ABSTRACT— Social media platforms use personalization algorithms to
make content curation decisions for each end user. These personalized
recommendation decisions are essentially speech conveying a platform’s
predictions on content relevance for each end user. Yet, they are causing
some of the worst problems on the internet. First, they facilitate the
precipitous spread of mis- and disinformation by exploiting the very same
biases and insecurities that drive end user engagement with such content.
Second, they exacerbate social media addiction and related mental health
harms by leveraging users’ affective needs to drive engagement to greater
and greater heights. Lastly, they erode end user privacy and autonomy as
both sources and incentives for data collection.
As with any harmful speech, the solution is often counterspeech. Free
speech jurisprudence considers counterspeech the most speech-protective
weapon to combat false or harmful speech. Thus, to combat problematic
recommendation decisions, social media platforms, policymakers, and other
stakeholders should embolden end users to use counterspeech to reduce the
harmful effects of platform personalization.
One way to implement this solution is through end user personalization
inputs. These inputs reflect end user expression about a platform’s
recommendation decisions. However, industry-standard personalization
inputs are failing to provide effective countermeasures against problematic
recommendation decisions. On most, if not all, major social media platforms,
the existing inputs confer limited ex post control over the platform’s
recommendation decisions. In order for end user personalization to achieve
the promise of counterspeech, I make several proposals along key regulatory
modalities, including revising the architecture of personalization inputs to
confer robust ex ante capabilities that filter by content type and
characteristics.
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INTRODUCTION
Having left a digital far right echo chamber, Caleb Cain started an
educational YouTube channel to liberate people like himself. He wanted to
help people break away from the toxic thought that once controlled him. But
his resolve resulted in online ridicule and death threats for being a “traitor.”
He even felt he had to buy a gun to protect himself from the online
community he had once enjoyed.1
It was not always like this for Cain. A few years back, he identified as
a liberal; but after he dropped out of community college, he started watching
many hours of YouTube in an aimless effort to find his path in life. 2
Gradually, he wandered into a far-right rabbit hole. 3 Cain found content
1
These facts are recounted in Kevin Roose, The Making of a YouTube Radical, N.Y. TIMES (June 8,
2019)
[hereinafter
Roose,
Making
of
a
YouTube
Radical],
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/06/08/technology/youtube-radical.html
[https://perma.cc/852H-YSNJ].
2
Id.
3
Sarah Gough, Caleb Cain: Former Far-Right Extremist Says ‘No One Has a Strategy’ for Ongoing
Threat, SKY NEWS (Feb. 25, 2021, 9:13 PM), https://news.sky.com/story/caleb-cain-former-far-rightextremist-says-no-one-has-a-strategy-for-ongoing-threat-12228120 [https://perma.cc/3YB9-V6P7]. See
generally Manoel Horta Ribeiro, Raphael Ottoni, Robert West, Virgílio A.F. Almeida & Wagner Meira
Jr., Auditing Radicalization Pathways on YouTube, in FAT* ‘20: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2020
CONFERENCE ON FAIRNESS, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND TRANSPARENCY 131, 140 (2020),
https://doi.org/10.1145/3351095.3372879 [https://perma.cc/HA7B-86SZ] (“[C]onsidering Alt-right
channels as a proxy for extreme content . . . a significant amount of commenting users systematically
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creators who spoke directly to his concerns as a young, white man:
conspiracy theories for his sense of powerlessness; misogynism for his
suspicion towards women; and mainstream media censorship for his fear of
voicelessness in American society.4 As a result, his high school friends no
longer recognized him as the empathetic and progressive person they had
known only a few years ago.5 Cain had been radicalized.
Fortunately, for the most part, Cain found his way back.6 After major
calls for reform, 7 YouTube’s recommendations—a constantly updating
personalization algorithm that considers many factors to render video
recommendations 8 —exposed Cain to a left-leaning community which
combined edgy humor, calm reasoning, and factual support to debunk the
far-right ideas he had consumed in bulk.9 Yet, his consumption of right-wing
content still persisted. 10 Alt-right “4Chan trolls,” to make matters worse,
named him a traitor and threatened to hang him for creating his own leftleaning YouTube channel. 11 This is when he felt he had to buy a gun to
protect himself.12 Yet, faced with pressure from online communities and a
recommendation algorithm that continued to curate far-right content for Cain,

migrates from commenting exclusively on milder content to commenting on more extreme content . . . .”);
Jonas Kaiser & Adrian Rauchfleisch, The Implications of Venturing Down the Rabbit Hole, INTERNET
POL’Y REV. (June 27, 2019), https://policyreview.info/articles/news/implications-venturing-down-rabbithole/1406 [https://perma.cc/8DQW-X9FB] (finding that mainstream content is generally “more than ten
jumps away from the problematic cluster of channels”).
4
Roose, Making of a YouTube Radical, supra note 1.
5
Id. (“It was kind of sad,” said Zelda Wait, a friend of Mr. Cain’s from high school.”).
6
Id.
7
See Kevin Roose, YouTube Unleashed a Conspiracy Theory Boom. Can It Be Contained?, N.Y.
TIMES
(Feb.
19,
2019)
[hereinafter
Roose,
Conspiracy
Theory
Boom],
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/19/technology/youtube-conspiracy-stars.html
[https://perma.cc/ST2Y-A9P6]. Since 2018, Algotransparency, along with journalists, NGOs, and
policymakers, has called attention to YouTube’s recommendation algorithm and its role in spreading misand disinformation. Our Impact, ALGOTRANSPARENCY, https://www.algotransparency.org/ourimpact.html [https://perma.cc/727X-AGZF].
8
YOUTUBE, Recommended Videos, https://www.youtube.com/howyoutubeworks/productfeatures/recommendations/?utm_campaign=1008960&utm_source=paidsearch&yt_product=ytgen&yt_
goal=eng&utm_medium=googlesearch&utm_content=txt&yt_campaign_id=hyw&yt_creative_id=&ut
m_keyword=how%20does%20youtube%20recommended%20videos%20work&utm_matchtype=e&gcl
id=Cj0KCQjwvr6EBhDOARIsAPpqUPG37svUQOsmNTboncsYb7KuCyBvyt2UP_U7azM39PanQ0N
3zHu2nbIaAsRoEALw_wcB#overview [https://perma.cc/TC7N-ACAN] (explaining the algorithm
considers such factors as watch and search history, channel subscriptions, geographic location, time of
day, other users’ engagement, direct user feedback, and more).
9
Roose, Making of a YouTube Radical, supra note 1.
10
Id. (showing a table titled “Here Are the Number of Political Videos Cain Watched Each Month”
that indicates right-wing content still dominated Caleb Cain’s content consumption).
11
Id.
12
Id.
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a gun may not be able to protect him from once again venturing into another
rabbit hole.13
This story exemplifies the precipitous spread of mis- and
disinformation across platforms14 and its radicalizing effects on society. Like
Caleb Cain, millions of users are susceptible. 15 This is because mis- and
disinformation tends to exploit the emotions of its audience by supplying
false but believable information that reinforces people’s misconceptions,
biases, and identities. 16 Once this content is hosted on a platform, the
platform’s personalization algorithm drives engagement to this content by
exposing users who are predicted to be receptive. These users then receive
similarly indexed content17 while the problematic content reaches similarly
profiled users.18 In this way, mis- and disinformation has the potential to
reach millions in seconds,19 enabling a familiar story of radicalization like
Caleb Cain’s to further unfold in our society.
13

Cf. Gough, supra note 3 (reporting that Caleb Cain believes anyone is susceptible to radicalization).
This article uses the word “platform” to refer to web services that host, moderate, curate, and
present another’s content for the consumption of an end user. The more technical term is “information
intermediary.”
Overview:
Information
Intermediaries,
OXFORD
REFERENCE
ONLINE (2021), https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100003398#:~:t
ext=Individuals%20and%20groups%20who%20obtain,or%20sell%20the%20company’s%20shares
[https://perma.cc/MJ4K-HKB8].
15
See generally Kelly Weill, Neo-Nazis Are Tearing the Furry World Apart, DAILY BEAST (May 5,
2017, 2:29 PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2017/04/13/neo-nazis-are-tearing-apart-thefurry-world.html [https://perma.cc/F6DP-NLFE] (explaining the speedy and destructive rise of the
#altfurry movement).
16
See, e.g., Alice Marwick & Rebecca Lewis, Media Manipulation and Disinformation Online,
DATA & SOC’Y RSCH. INST. 29 (2017) [hereinafter Marwick & Lewis, Media Manipulation] (“Far-right
movements exploit young men’s rebellion and dislike of “political correctness” to spread white
supremacist thought, Islamophobia, and misogyny through irony and knowledge of internet culture.”); cf.
William J. Brady, Julian A. Wills, John T. Jost, Joshua A. Tucker & Jay J. Van Bavel, Emotion Shapes
the Diffusion of Moralized Content in Social Networks, 114 PNAS 7313, 7313 (2017) (observing the
phenomenon of “moral contagion” where each additional moral-emotional word provided a 20% increase
in content diffusion but only between group members (e.g., liberals)). However, this strategy of content
engagement is not unique to mis- and disinformation. See Michael Sülflow, Svenja Schäfer & Stephan
Winter, Selective Attention in the News Feed: An Eye-Tracking Study on the Perception and Selection of
Political News Posts on Facebook, 21 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 168, 183 (2019). Yet, in the context of misand disinformation, this strategy reinforces destructive, harmful or prejudicial attitudes to drive content
engagement.
17
Cf. Julia Angwin, Facebook Enabled Advertisers to Reach ‘Jew Haters,’ PROPUBLICA (Sept. 14,
2017, 4:00 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-enabledadvertisers-to-reach-jew-haters
[https://perma.cc/6YPF-6G8C] (explaining how Facebook presents targeted advertisements as seamlessly
as possible among similar content).
18
James N. Cohen, Exploring Echo-Systems: How Algorithms Shape Immersive Media
Environments, 10 J. MEDIA LITERACY EDUC. 139, 142 (2018) [hereinafter Cohen, Exploring EchoSystems]. See generally Engin Bozdag, Bias in Algorithmic Filtering and Personalization, 15 ETHICS &
INFO. TECH. 209, 215 (2013).
19
See ZEYNEP TUFEKCI, TWITTER AND TEAR GAS: THE POWER AND FRAGILITY OF NETWORKED
PROTEST 135 (2017) (“[T]he more people who use a platform, the more useful that platform is to each
14
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This precarious spread of mis- and disinformation and its radicalizing
effects flourish in pivotal part because of personalization algorithms.20 In
order to generate advertising revenue, 21 platforms strive to keep users’
attention and increase engagement.22 Necessary to this pursuit are several
items. First, platforms need vast amounts of individualized user data
regarding anything from engagement histories to personal characteristics.23
Second, platforms analyze user data to predict future engagement patterns,24
thus identifying content engagement drivers such as a user’s interests,
curiosities, and identities as well as their anxieties, biases, and suspicions.25
Finally, to implement the platform’s individualized predictive analyses,
platforms employ algorithms that render personalized algorithmic curation
decisions to deliver “relevant” content to each user. The more relevant and
tailored the content is, the more likely an end user will engage, thereby
driving ad-revenue, more data, new predictions, and increased
personalization. For brevity, I refer to these personalized algorithmic
curation decisions as “recommendation decisions.”26
user.”). See generally JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP IT (2008)
(explaining network effects in the context of the Internet).
20
See Alice E. Marwick, Why do People Share Fake News? A Sociotechnical Model of Media Effects,
2 GEO. TECH. L. REV. 474, 506 (2018) [hereinafter Marwick, Fake News?].
21
Although platforms may utilize subscription-based services or rely on users’ donations to stay
afloat, advertising is the default revenue model in the digital age. See Ethan Zuckerman, The Internet’s
Original
Sin,
ATLANTIC
(Aug.
14,
2014),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/08/advertising-is-the-internets-originalsin/376041/ [https://perma.cc/D426-ACAR].
22
See Tim Wu, Blind Spot: The Attention Economy and the Law, 82 ANTITRUST L.J. 771, 788–89
(2019) (“The high-tech Attention Brokers like Google and Facebook have made much of their ability to
very precisely target the right audiences and the right states of mind.”).
23
See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society: Big Data, Private Governance,
and New School Speech Regulation, 51 U.C. DAVIS 1149, 1155 (2018) (“The goal of the Algorithmic
Society is practical omniscience: that is, the ability to know as much as possible about who is doing what,
when, and where; and the ability to predict who will do what, when, and where.”); How Feed Works,
FACEBOOK
[hereinafter
Facebook,
How
Feed
Works],
https://www.facebook.com/help/1155510281178725 [https://perma.cc/LE8L-SSVB] (explaining that the
posts seen on Facebook’s Feed personalization algorithm are influenced by an end user’s connections and
individual engagement activity on Facebook).
24
Zeynep Tufekci, Engineering the Public: Big data, Surveillance and Computational Politics,
FIRST MONDAY, July 2014, https://firstmonday.org/article/view/4901/4097 [https://perma.cc/Z644-4RSS]
(“[T]he advent of big datasets that contain imprints of actual behavior and social network information —
social interactions, conversations, friendship networks, history of reading and commenting on a variety
of platforms — along with advances in computational techniques means that political campaigns (and
indeed, advertisers, corporations and others with the access to these databases as well as technical
resources) can model individual voter preferences and attributes at a high level of precision . . . .”).
25
See Michal Kosinski, David Stillwell & Thore Graepel, Private Traits and Attributes Are
Predictable from Digital Records of Human Behavior, 110 PNAS 5802, 5802 (2013).
26
This terminology was inspired by Professor Benjamin’s term “algorithm-based decision,” which
he used to easily refer to “decisions made by protocols, algorithms, and other computations.” Stuart Minor
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Personalization and resulting recommendation decisions can be both a
general boon and a grievous bane for users. On the one hand,
recommendation decisions provide users the convenience of receiving
increasingly more interesting, educational, and novel content for those who
may not have the time or capacity to do so themselves.27 On the other hand,
because of the platform’s commercial interest in driving user engagement,
these decisions often expose users to content that tends to exploit their
prejudices and insecurities. 28 This article does not aim to minimize the
important—perhaps essential—role recommendation decisions play in
navigating the vast troves of content online and improving the user
experience. Rather, it focuses on how platform recommendation decisions
embody expressive decisions that amplify problematic content like mis- and
disinformation by leveraging the very same engagement drivers that attract
end users to such content.
Platform recommendation decisions not only facilitate the spread of
mis- and disinformation. They also promote social media addiction and
erode user privacy and autonomy. Like mis- and disinformation, addictive
content drives engagement by exploiting an end user’s emotional response.
But rather than leveraging biases and insecurities, addictive content takes
advantage of the affective needs of its audience. Recommendation decisions
then use that reality to drive engagement. The more exposure to content that
fulfills an end user’s affective needs, the more they tend to exhibit behaviors
associated with addiction, such as relapse and desensitization.29 In fact, such
behavioral tendencies, as some authors argue, result in neurological changes

Benjamin, Algorithms and Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1445, 1447 n.4 (2013). Here, for ease and to draw
focus to the resulting decisions of personalization algorithms, rather than their computational processes,
I choose to refer to a personalization algorithm’s output as a recommendation decision. Further, one may
naturally compare content personalization with content moderation, which involves sitewide decisions to
demote or remove content from a platform’s service. Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People,
Rules, and Processes Governing Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1599, 1635 (2018) (“These methods
can be either reactive, in which moderators passively assess content and update software only after others
bring the content to their attention, or proactive, in which teams of moderators actively seek out published
content for removal.”). This article is not about moderation, save the regulatory difficulties they present
as an alternative solution. See, e.g., infra notes 124–127 and 191 and accompanying text.
27
See, e.g., Aaron Smith, Skye Toor & Patrick van Kessel, Many Turn to YouTube for Children’s
Content, News, How-To Lessons, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Nov. 7, 2018) [hereinafter Smith et al., Many Turn to
YouTube],
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2018/11/07/many-turn-to-youtube-for-childrenscontent-news-how-to-lessons/?utm_source=AdaptiveMailer&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=116-18%20Youtube%20content&org=982&lvl=100&ite=3395&lea=786973&ctr=0&par=1&trk=
[https://perma.cc/5YPB-TGDB] (showing that 51% of adult YouTube users in America use the platform
for education while 28% are “just passing the time”).
28
See infra Section II.A.
29
See infra Section II.B.
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that are essentially no different from those induced by physical substance
abuse.30
Further, privacy and autonomy harms flow directly from increased use
of recommendation decisions.31 More personalization means an ever-recent
and -accurate supply of content engagement data points.32 These data points
facilitate a platform’s ability to predict what users want and need, sometimes
before users even know it. 33 Naturally this predictive ability enables
platforms to influence users’ content engagement patterns, thereby eroding
individual privacy and autonomy.34 Thus, privacy and autonomy harms, as
well as social media addiction and related mental health harms, are functions
of personalization algorithms.
Despite the harmful effects of personalization, critical legal discourse
has been scarce. Prominent legal scholars who have written on the subject
largely agree that algorithm-based decisions like recommendation decisions
are speech under the First Amendment. 35 In fact, Professor Tim Wu
suggested that personalization algorithms, which he termed “automated
concierges,” are not likely afforded protection unless “this program would
return not simply a mechanical projection based on the user’s previous
choices, but rather a true recommendation based on the opinions, and indeed
the prejudices, of the programmer.”36
This article goes further. If recommendation decisions are speech, I
argue that the best solution to their harmful effects is robust end user
counterspeech. 37 This most naturally takes the form of end user
personalization inputs.38 Such tools allow users to influence and control the
30
James Niels Rosenquist, Fiona M. Scott Morton & Samuel N. Weinstein, Addictive Technologies
and Its Implications for Antitrust Enforcement, 100 N.C. L. REV. 431, 446 (2022).
31
See, e.g., Fanbo Meng, Xitong Guo, Kee-hung Lai & Xinli Zhao, A Personalization-Privacy
Paradox in Usage of Mobile Health Services: A Game Theoretic Perspective, in WHICEB 2018
PROCEEDINGS 539, 539 (2018) (“The tension between personalization and privacy hinders users’
adoption of mobile health services.”).
32
See infra Part I.
33
See infra Sections I.B and II.C. See generally Kashmir Hill, How Target Figured Out a Teen Girl
Was Pregnant Before Her Father Did, FORBES (Feb. 16, 2012, 11:02 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2012/02/16/how-target-figured-out-a-teen-girl-was-pregnantbefore-her-father-did/?sh=2a6892056668 [https://perma.cc/2W8J-RS68] (reporting that Target’s
individual and aggregate demographic and historical buying data collection predicted a pregnancy before
an end user’s parents even knew about it).
34
See infra Section II.C.
35
See infra Section I.C.
36
Tim Wu, Machine Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1495, 1467 (2013) [hereinafter Wu, Machine
Speech].
37
See infra Section III.
38
End user personalization is also called “customization.” See Tuck Siong Chung, Michel Wedel &
Roland T. Rust, Adaptive Personalization Using Social Networks, 44 J. ACAD. MARKETING SCI. 66, 66
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content-hosting platform’s recommendation decisions.39 Thus, they are the
most direct form of user input into the platform’s individualized content
curation decisions.40
However, the predominant personalization tools are falling short as
capable countermeasures in four distinct ways.41 First, personalization inputs
provide ex post, not ex ante, control over content. Second, such control is
limited in scope like a pinhole on a vast map of content, since users are able
to directly block only one particular video or channel per input. Third, and
relatedly, personalization inputs act as preferences, rather than prohibitions
on similar types of content. Lastly, the most powerful personalization inputs
are largely speaker-based, rather than content-based. Thus, in pursuit of user
personalization as effective counterspeech, these shortcomings should be
corrected and users should receive a more robust suite of ex ante contentfiltering controls. In this way, the expressively weak users of today can
effectively counter the algorithmic decisions of the expressively powerful
platforms of tomorrow, thereby thwarting the spread of mis- and
disinformation, as well as related harms resulting from platform
personalization, such as content addiction and privacy and autonomy harms.
Under this approach, the role of platforms’ recommendation decisions
in exacerbating some of the internet’s most salient harms merely reflects the
longstanding and often-observed power divide between platforms as private
corporations with the ability to manipulate masses of people for profit, and
relatively speech-weak users in spaces where the Supreme Court has
acknowledged that some of the most important speech is taking place. 42
Recognizing personalization as a means of providing effective
counterspeech in the modern digital public sphere could help shift the
balance of expressive power from platforms to users, thereby providing our
democracy a healthier and more sustainable public sphere.
This article seeks to establish the following prescriptive argument: in
order to counter false, harmful, addictive, or otherwise problematic online
content, social media platforms should provide a more robust suite of user
ex ante content-filtering personalization tools. Part I provides a technical
primer on algorithms and explains why recommendation decisions constitute
platform speech under the First Amendment. Part II discusses how
(2016). Although the latter term more strongly connotes control by the end user, I use the former term to
reflect the power struggle between the platform’s right to personalize their service and the end user’s right
to personalize the information they receive.
39
See infra Section III.A.
40
See infra Section III.A.
41
See infra Section IV.A.
42
See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017) (“These websites can provide
perhaps the most powerful mechanisms available to a private citizen to make his or her voice heard.”).
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recommendation decisions—the platform’s own expression—exacerbate
some of the internet’s most salient problems, namely the spread of mis- and
disinformation, social media addiction and other mental health concerns, as
well as privacy and autonomy harms. Part III establishes end user
personalization inputs as a form of counterspeech and describes how
personalization tools offer a potential, and rather quintessential, solution to
redressing the role of recommendation decisions in spreading problematic
content. Part IV identifies the problems with industry-standard end user
personalization and offers several proposals that policymakers, platforms,
and other stakeholders can take to advance more robust end user
personalization. Part V briefly concludes.
I.

ALGORITHMIC CONTENT CURATION AS PLATFORM SPEECH
A. Algorithms: A Technical Primer

In order to understand how platforms “speak” through algorithm-based
decisions, it is helpful to understand algorithms at their most fundamental
level. In essence, algorithms are a set of step-by-step instructions for
executing a specific task. 43 For example, a plain-language algorithm for
obtaining a mathematical average of two numbers might be “[a]dd the
numbers and take half of the result.”44 Thus, this algorithm consists of a mere
two steps that manipulate numbers as inputs to reach a mathematical average
of two numbers as the desired output. An algorithm may also consist of a
decision support system that results in a medical diagnosis, given certain
patient inputs such as hypertension and heart disease.45 Even something as
simple as the steps for brushing teeth is an algorithm for achieving the
desired output of clean teeth.46
In the context of informational technology, algorithms consist of code,
written by a person and implemented by a computer.47 Programmers write
source code to craft algorithms which computers then compile to effectuate

43
JAMES GRIMMELMAN, INTERNET LAW: CASES & PROBLEMS 24 (2020); see also Benjamin, supra
note 26, at 1447 n.4 (“There is no single accepted definition of ‘algorithm’. . . . Broadly speaking, an
algorithm is a set of instructions designed to produce an output.”); Joshua A. Kroll, Accountable
Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. Rev. 633, 640 n.14 (2016) (“The term ‘algorithm’ is assigned disparate
technical meaning in the literatures of computer science and other fields . . . .”).
44
GRIMMELMAN, supra note 43, at 24.
45
Jenna Burrell, How the Machine ‘Thinks’: Understanding Opacity in Machine Learning
Algorithms, BIG DATA & SOC’Y 1, 5 (2016).
46
See Deven R. Desai & Joshua A. Kroll, Trust but Verify: A Guide to Algorithms and the Law, 31
HARV. L.J. TECH. 1, 23 (2017).
47
Burrell, supra note 45, at 3 (“Code writing is a necessary skill for computational implementation
of algorithms . . . .”).
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human goals.48 As Professor Stuart Minor Benjamin states, “[m]ore and more
of our activity involves not merely the transmission of bits, but the
transmission of bits according to algorithms and protocols created by humans
and implemented by machines.” 49 Although “bits” tends to refer to
information transmitted through electronic signals, 50 the fundamentals
remain the same across contexts: algorithms use certain inputs to achieve
desired outputs. Such outputs may be dubbed: algorithm-based decisions.51
Machine learning algorithms complicate the picture. But although these
algorithms are quite different from simple classifier algorithms, they share a
basic structure in that, whether learned or not, the computer implements
instructions that are designed to achieve a certain outcome. This is because
machine learning algorithms involve predictive computational decisions that
depend on a matrix of weights which continually optimizes itself with new
inputs. 52 In this way, machine learning algorithms “learn” through vast
amounts of data, thereby eliminating the human hand in programming and
increasing decision-making opacity beyond human understanding. 53
Although the self-adjusting nature of these algorithms diminish the need for
human control and increase decision-making opacity, programmers or
developers can still adjust machine learning algorithms to achieve decisions
consistent with new values, goals, or realizations.54
B. Personalized Recommendation Decisions
In the context of web services that host, moderate, curate, and present
another’s content for the consumption of end users, 55 personalization
algorithms refer to the set of instructions specifically tasked to curate—
48

Compare GRIMMELMAN, supra note 43, at 23–24 (explaining that computers must compile source
code into object code in order to execute a task), with Desai & Kroll, supra note 46, at 24–26 (suggesting
that “an algorithm’s correctness can only be established relative to a specification of its behavior,” which
may simply be “informal or notional” if a programmer operates from a poorly defined goal in the first
place).
49
Benjamin, supra note 26, at 1446.
50
Id. at 1446 n.1.
51
This nomenclature helps to delineate the algorithm as opposed to its outcome.
52
Burrell, supra note 45, at 5. See generally Jason Brownlee, A Tour of Machine Learning
Algorithms, MACHINE LEARNING MASTERY (Aug. 12, 2019), https://machinelearningmastery.com/atour-of-machine-learning-algorithms/ [https://perma.cc/PG8U-T9HK] (taxonomizing machine learning
algorithms by learning type and functional similarity).
53
Burrell, supra note 45, at 5–9; see also Swaroop Poudel, Internet of Things: Underlying
Technologies, Interoperability, and Threats to Privacy and Security, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 997, 1008
(2016).
54
See, e.g., The YouTube Team, Continuing Our Work To Improve Recommendations on YouTube,
YOUTUBE (Jan. 25, 2019), https://blog.youtube/news-and-events/continuing-our-work-to-improve/
[https://perma.cc/77JQ-42NY].
55
See Roose, Making of a YouTube Radical, supra note 1.
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localize, customize, and channel—hosted content for individual users. 56
They largely, if not exclusively, curate by relevance to individual users.57 To
make these personalized recommendation decisions, platform
personalization algorithms first require data profiles about individual end
users. 58 This data typically includes engagement patterns with previous
content, including whether they liked, disliked, or empathized,59 the length
of pauses,60 demographic data, including age, race, and geographic location,
and more. 61 Aggregate user data can also help profile similar end users.
Using this data, the platform can then analyze an individual user’s past
engagement patterns to reliably predict future ones. 62 Based on these
predictions, the platform can assess curate the content that is most likely to
elicit engagement. This process is called content personalization.
Personalization algorithms accomplish a variety of interconnected but
conceptually distinct purposes. First, they strive to keep the end user’s
attention.63 Tailoring an end user’s content helps the end user stay engaged
with the platform. Otherwise, users may become disinterested or bored,
potentially leaving the platform or opting to take their attention elsewhere.
Second, personalization algorithms increase advertising revenue.64 Platforms
sell user attention to advertisers “for cash.” 65 Third, personalization

56

Bozdag, supra note 18, at 215.
See, e.g., Chung et al., supra note 38, at 69 (“Feeds relevant to a specific user easily get lost in the
streams of feeds of subject areas of little interest. Therefore, most news sites offer personalization
options . . . .”). But see Christine Warner, This is Exactly How Social Media Algorithms Work Today,
SKYWORD (May 3, 2018), https://www.skyword.com/contentstandard/this-is-exactly-how-social-mediaalgorithms-work-today/ [https://perma.cc/KQ29-JQZF] (including algorithms that filter by recency
within the scope of a personalization algorithm).
58
Bozdag, supra note 18, at 213.
59
Casey Newton, Facebook Rolls Out Expanded Like Button Reactions Around the World, VERGE
(Feb. 24, 2016, 8:00 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2016/2/24/11094374/facebook-reactions-likebutton [https://perma.cc/59ZH-UVL9].
60
Cf. Jack Karsten & Darrell M. West, Amazon Go Store Offers Quicker Checkout for Greater Data
Collection, BROOKINGS (Feb. 13, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2018/02/13/amazongo-store-offers-quicker-checkout-for-greater-data-collection/
[https://perma.cc/T357-6KV2]
(“[C]ameras and other sensors must create a digital model of the store that updates in real-time as items
and shoppers move around the store.”).
61
Bozdag, supra note 18, at 213.
62
See Michal Kosinski, David Stillwell & Thore Graepel, Private Traits and Attributes Are
Predictable from Digital Records of Human Behavior, 110 PNAS 5802, 5802 (2013).
63
See, e.g., Wu, supra note 22, at 771–72 (characterizing platforms as attention brokers who attracts
attention by offering something to the public); Julie E. Cohen, Law for the Platform Economy, 51 U. CAL.
DAVIS 133, 146 (2017) [hereinafter Cohen, Platform Economy] (describing that platforms engage in
multi-sided markets, serving users to keep their attention and advertisers who seek users’ attention).
64
Wu, supra note 22, at 772.
65
Id.
57
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algorithms help platforms gather additional end user data.66 Platforms benefit
from data on user engagement with individually curated content because the
data are direct feedback on its recommendations.67 Fourth, the data derived
from the recommendations allow the personalization algorithm to learn and
tweak its future recommendations to provide even more “relevant” content
to end users.68
C. Recommendation Decisions as Platform Speech
Platforms embrace the image of neutrality. After all, platforms serve
different constituencies, which requires them to “elid[e] the tensions inherent
in their service: between user-generated and commercially-produced content,
between cultivating community and serving up advertising, between
intervening in the delivery of content and remaining neutral.” 69 For example,
YouTube holds itself out as an open, egalitarian service, one that aims “to
give everyone a voice and show them the world.” 70 Similarly, Facebook
demonstrated its long-standing commitment to neutrality when it decided to
simply flag content as “disputed,” rather than to remove such content
altogether, as a means to curb the spread of mis- and disinformation on its
service. 71 This decision effectively amounted to Facebook’s continued
resistance, or at least hesitation, to exercising an excessive degree of editorial
control over the quality and quantity of hosted content.72
Yet, platforms play an active role in the digital public sphere. As
platforms strive to maintain neutrality in their service, it is easy to forget that
they also exercise their own expressive influence through recommendation
decisions. Just as a content creator engages in expression when they upload
their own content, or an end user exercises their preference when they choose
their next video, the platform imbues its recommendation decisions with its
values and expressions. Simply put, the platform itself is one of many

66

Cohen, Exploring Echo-Systems, supra note 18, at 142.
Id. at 141 (“Over the entire length of time a user participates on social media or media sites, the
small actions and digital interactions, such as likes, comments, ratings, reads, views, and shares, are
accumulated into large mathematical databases.”).
68
Id. at 142 (“By allowing users to rate, not only does Netflix improve its data library, but allows
the system to repurpose the data to predict likely choices a viewer may make on the platform.”).
69
Tarleton Gillespie, The Politics of ‘Platforms,’ 12 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 347, 348 (2010).
70
About, YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/about/ [https://perma.cc/623K-JQU2].
71
Farhad Manjoo, Can Facebook Fix Its Own Worst Bug?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2017),
http://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/25/magazine/can-facebook-fix-its-own-worst-bug.html
[https://perma.cc/E3DV-4VKU].
72
Id.
67
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speakers on its service. And a natural implication of this reality is that their
apparent neutrality over digital expression is a façade.73
As speakers in the digital public sphere, platforms benefit from First
Amendment protection. Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC (Turner I) 74
required two and only two elements for First Amendment coverage: that
cable operators choose what to air and that in doing so they seek to
communicate some message.75 Thus, Professor Benjamin argued that any
algorithm-based decision that seeks to communicate some substantive
message to an end user who can recognize that message constitutes platform
speech.76
Under this analysis, products like Facebook Feed and Google’s search
results would be protected speech.77 Although the user experience may differ,
both Facebook Feed and Google’s search results are algorithmic outputs.
They seek to communicate substantive information that the service provider
deems relevant, popular, helpful, or valuable to a receptive end user.78
Intuition may suggest that no machine can produce expression in a
meaningful way. This hesitation would embody the idea that platforms are
merely pushing their expressive input to the front end of algorithmic speech
production (to the design and learning method of its algorithm) and leave the
mere implementation of their expression for the machine learning algorithm
on the back end. 79 Under Professor Benjamin’s analysis, however,
recommendation decisions would constitute platform speech because they
also seek to communicate substantive information which the platform deems
relevant for end users who are ready and able to understand the relevance of
such content.80
Professor Tim Wu analyzed this issue under a theory of de facto
functionality. 81 He explained that carriers and conduits would not receive
coverage because they merely pass along unadulterated, unedited
73
Anupam Chander & Vivek Krishnamurthy, The Myth of Platform Neutrality, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV.
400, 411 (2018) (“Law can also promote neutrality by conditioning immunities on passivity, which is a
species of neutrality.”).
74
512 U.S. 622 (1994).
75
Benjamin, supra note 26, at 1459–60 (quoting Turner I, 512 U.S. at 636).
76
Id. at 1463, 1471.
77
See id. at 1467, 1470–71.
78
Id. at 1467–71.
79
Id. at 1467.
80
See Aaron Smith, Many Facebook Users Don’t Understand How the Site’s News Feed Works,
PEW RSCH. CTR. (Sept. 5, 2018) [hereinafter Smith, Many Facebook Users Don’t Understand],
https://pewrsr.ch/2NmcbIR [https://perma.cc/JR67-X6AV] (finding that “just 38% of Facebook users
ages 50 and older say they have a good understanding of why certain posts are included in it, compared
with 59% of users ages 18 to 29”).
81
Wu, Machine Speech, supra note 36, at 1496.
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information.82 Further, tools like graphs, charts, and contracts do not receive
coverage because they merely perform some task, rather than communicate
some message.83 Algorithms properly fall within these “communication tool”
categories when they primarily facilitate another’s communication or
perform some task for the user.84 On the other hand, algorithms would be
“speech products” when they fulfill a vessel function for the speaker’s ideas
or convey consciously curated content.85
Applying this theory, Professor Wu distinguished between two types of
personalization algorithms, which he called “automated concierges”: ones
that curate content based on past data, 86 and more “intelligent” ones that
“would return not simply a mechanical projection based on the user’s
previous choices, but rather a true recommendation based on the opinions,
and indeed the prejudices, of the programmer.” 87 He argues that, as a
communication tool, the former would likely not receive First Amendment
protection because it merely reminds the user of past preferences.88 The latter
resembles a speech product because of its infusion with the platform’s
ideas.89 Thus, under Professor Wu’s analysis, recommendation decisions that
resemble a regurgitation of past engagement patterns would not be protected,
whereas decisions informed by past user data and platform relevance
predictions would be.
While many prominent scholars who wrote on the subject of
algorithmic speech largely agree that recommendation decisions count as
platform speech, the Supreme Court has not had occasion to decide the issue
on its merits. 90 In Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, 91 the
Court came close, ruling that video games were protected speech.92 Since
video games are entirely constructed from expressive algorithm-based
82

Id. at 1497.
Id.
84
Id. at 1498.
85
Id.; see also Eugene Volokh & Donald M. Falk, Google First Amendment Protection for Search
Engine Search Results, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 883, 884–92 (2012).
86
Wu, Machine Speech, supra note 36, at 1532.
87
Id. at 1533.
88
Id. at 1532 (“[This] is really nothing more than reminding the user what she already wants.”).
89
Id. at 1533.
90
The broad immunity provided by Section 230 presents a substantial barrier to sustaining actions
arising from a platform’s editorial recommendation decisions. David S. Ardia, Free Speech Savior or
Shield for Scoundrels: An Empirical Study of Intermediary Immunity under Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 373, 382 (2010) (“Although section 230 set a high
bar for plaintiffs to overcome, more than a third of their claims survived preemption.”).
91
564 U.S. 786 (2011).
92
Id. at 790 (“Like the protected books, plays, and movies that preceded them, video games
communicate ideas—and even social messages—through many familiar literary devices . . . and through
features distinctive to the medium . . . .”).
83
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outputs,93 this lends support to the idea that recommendation decisions are
protected speech. Further, Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo94 held
that a media company’s ability to exercise its “editorial control and judgment”
falls squarely within First Amendment coverage.95 The Court indicated that
choice of material, treatment of issues, and decisions regarding the size and
content of the publication comprised a newspaper’s traditional editorial
function.96 Thus, Tornillo favors the notion that recommendation decisions,
as a form of editorial control, are protected speech.97
Reasoning from these decisions, district courts have held that the First
Amendment protects algorithm-based outputs like search engines results.98
Jian Zhang v. Baidu.com99 is the earliest case to take up the issue. The court
held that the First Amendment shielded the defendant’s search engine
results. 100 The plaintiff sought “to hold Baidu liable for, and thus punish
Baidu for, a conscious decision to design its search-engine algorithms to
favor certain expression on core political subjects over other expression on
those same political subjects.”101 This theory of liability is at odds with the
idea that Baidu was merely a passive platform that delivered content in a
neutral way. Thus, understanding that the First Amendment protects a
93
Cf. id. (acknowledging the expressive features of video games, albeit in a manner distinctive from
books, plays, and movies). See generally Simon Carryer, The Brains in Games: Video Game AI,
TOWARDS DATA SCI. (May 9, 2019), https://towardsdatascience.com/the-brains-in-games-video-gameai-d0f601ccdf46 [https://perma.cc/K9ZT-WRFU] (“Video games employ algorithms to respond
intelligently to players’ inputs.”); Tim Crosby, How Making a Video Game Works, HOW STUFF WORKS
(July
18,
2008),
https://electronics.howstuffworks.com/making-a-video-game.htm
[https://perma.cc/XKA8-4RQU].
94
418 U.S. 241 (1974).
95
Id. at 258.
96
Id.
97
A distinction between different types of platforms is worth noting. News aggregators function in
a similar way to print newspapers in the mass media context. Both compile stories from different authors
and curate newsworthy information. Print newspapers, however, originate from a centralized speaker,
with a singular editorial vision, while news aggregators make recommendations on stories authored by
many different speakers with disparate editorial visions. Nonetheless, those recommendation decisions
come from a central speaker with a singular editorial vision—presenting relevant content—such that an
aggregator’s interest in maintaining editorial control remains compelling. However, when analyzing
social media platforms, the differences become stark. Unlike stories compiled in the mass media context
or even stories recommended in the news aggregator context, information on social media is not always
newsworthy. Although the private nature and general lack of newsworthiness of recommendation
decisions do not render the speech unworthy of protection, these factors may weaken the protection
afforded to such decisions. This effect is further discussed in Section IV.B.2.
98
E.g., e-Venture Worldwide, LLC v. Google, 188 F. Supp. 3d 1265 (2016); Search King Inc. v.
Google Tech., Inc., 2003 WL 21464568 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003).
99
Jian Zhang v. Baidu.com, 10 F. Supp. 3d 433 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
100
Id. at 439–40.
101
Id. at 440; see also Benjamin, supra note 26 at 1469–70; Volokh & Falk, supra note 85, at 898–
99; James Grimmelmann, Speech Engines, 98 MINN. L. REV. 868, 868 (2014).
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newspaper’s editorial choice over content, the Baidu court reasoned that the
First Amendment also protected Baidu’s editorial bias for certain political
content. 102 Because recommendation decisions are derived more from
platform analytics and not from user queries like search engine results, this
reasoning would easily extend to recommendation decisions. In sum, these
decisions, as well as the analysis of numerous leading scholars, support the
proposition that recommendation decisions would be protected speech if the
issue were adjudicated.
II. POWER OF RECOMMENDATION DECISIONS OVER USERS
We can understand recommendation decisions as exerting expressive
power over users. As explained above, they have significant positive
dimensions, delivering educational, novel, and entertaining content to users.
At the same time, they expose users to false, addictive, and otherwise
problematic content. Section II.A examines mis- and disinformation as an
excellent example of the kind of problematic content that recommendation
decisions expressively impose on relatively speech-weak users. Section II.B
then argues that recommendation decisions play a similarly integral role in
facilitating social media addiction and related mental health harms. Lastly,
Section II.C explains how privacy and autonomy harms flow from
recommendation decisions.
A. Mis- and Disinformation
If disinformation is generally defined as intentionally false but
reasonably believable information that exploits end users’ anxieties,
emotions, and prejudices to entice engagement, then misinformation is
similarly defined as reasonably believable “false, mistaken, or misleading
information” that also relies on those same subconscious levers to drive
engagement.103 The falsity of the content, therefore, goes hand in hand with
the very factors that tend to drive end users to such content. It is because of
this symbiosis between content falsity and content engagement that
personalization algorithms tend to spread mis- and disinformation through

102
See Jian Zhang, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 440 (concluding that the theory of liability—punishing Baidu’s
“conscious decision to design its search-engine algorithms to favor certain expression”—would violate
Baidu’s editorial autonomy).
103
James H. Fetzer, Disinformation: The Use of False Information, 14 MINDS & MACHS. 231, 231
(2004). Defining the scope of these terms is still subject to a lively scholarly debate. See, e.g., Marwick,
Fake News?, supra note 20, at 485 (choosing to sweep the fluid term “fake news” into a general term
“problematic information”); Catherine J. Ross, Ministry of Truth? Why Law Can’t Stop Prevarications,
Bullshit, and Straight-Out Lies in Political Campaigns, 16 FIRST AMEND. L. Rev. 367, 370 (2017)
(proposing a taxonomy for campaign falsehoods).
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recommendation decisions. Until a platform chooses to intervene,104 these
algorithms autonomously render decisions that expose—and re-expose—
end users to mis- and disinformation to drive engagement.105
Both YouTube 106 and Facebook 107 have well-documented problems
with mis- and disinformation. For example, videos spreading disinformation
in the form of conspiracy theories run rampant on YouTube, often garnering
tens of millions of views in the span of a few days.108 Sometimes set against
an unnerving soundtrack, this type of content would
“unspool[] a series of far-fetched hypotheses” like how iPhones record every
word uttered in its proximity, how California wildfires were part of a purposeful
insurance fraud scheme, and even how “the mass shooting at Sandy Hook
Elementary School in 2012 was a hoax perpetrated by gun control advocates.”109

Even without factual support,110 these kinds of videos drive engagement
by playing on viewers’ skepticism towards official power structures and
fascination with gaming the system.111 Based on engagement patterns and
user data profiles, YouTube’s personalization algorithm tends to curate these
videos for end users predicted to be receptive to conspiracy theories and the
underlying emotional drivers they elicit.112 In late 2019, recognizing the role
of its recommendation decisions in spreading mis- and disinformation,
YouTube vowed to “start[] reducing recommendations of borderline content

104
Madison Malone Kircher, Are Tech Companies Lazy, Incompetent, or Greedy?, INTELLIGENCER
(Sept. 15, 2017), https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2017/09/google-facebook-and-twitter-sell-hatespeech-targeted-ads.html [https://perma.cc/AY6W-G4TJ]
(suggesting that platforms neither lack competence nor operate for profit alone).
105
YouTube also recognizes the role its personalization algorithm plays in spreading mis- and
disinformation. See Reducing the Spread of Borderline Content and Harmful Misinformation, YOUTUBE,
https://www.youtube.com/howyoutubeworks/our-commitments/fighting-misinformation/#reducing-thespread-of-borderline-content [https://perma.cc/XXW8-33RQ].
106
ALGROTRANSPARENCY, supra note 7.
107
E.g., All Things Considered, ‘Facebook Groups Are Destroying America’: Researcher on
Misinformation
Spread
Online,
NPR
(June
22,
2020),
https://www.npr.org/2020/06/22/881826881/facebook-groups-are-destroying-america-researcher-onmisinformation-spread-online [https://perma.cc/BZ45-QMDB] (“[Facebook groups] ha[ve] been the
primary vector of disinformation on Facebook for the past several years.”).
108
Roose, Conspiracy Theory Boom, supra note 7.
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
Marwick & Lewis, Media Manipulation, supra note 16, at 18. See generally Cass R. Sunstein,
Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 112 (2000) (“[M]embers will
move to positions that lack merit but are predictable consequences of the particular circumstances of
enclave deliberation. In the extreme case, enclave deliberation may even put social stability at risk (for
better or for worse).”).
112
See supra Section I.B.
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or videos that could misinform users in harmful ways.”113 At the same time,
YouTube effectively acknowledged that it can control its recommendation
decisions not to expose users to content deemed akin to conspiracy theories
and other forms of mis- and disinformation.114
Spreading mis- and disinformation has many problems115 but two are
especially important: falsity and radicalization. The first is rather obvious.
The spread of false information is a harm to end users and the society they
find themselves in.116 Truth is not monolithic. Yet, promoting the spread of
falsity leads end users further away from objective reality, thereby
weakening their ability to engage in society in a meaningful way—as voters,
employees, and consumers. This atomization of a common reality is exactly
what recommendation decisions tend to facilitate by spreading mis- and
disinformation.117
With falsity comes radicalization. By allaying fears, confirming
suspicions, and rationalizing apparent discrepancies, mis- and
disinformation has an emotional appeal which captures and converts end
users into walking, talking embodiments of the content individually curated
for them.118 Naturally, in an effort to keep users coming back for more, the
platform’s individualized recommendation decisions become more extreme,

113

Roose, Conspiracy Theory Boom, supra note 7.
Id. Due to growing scrutiny around its recommendation decisions, TikTok has also made the same
acknowledgment. Mia Sato, TikTok Says It’s Varying For You Recommendations To Avoid Harmful
Content
Holes,
VERGE
(Dec.
16,
2021,
10:31
AM),
https://www.theverge.com/2021/12/16/22839453/tiktok-for-you-recommendations-harmful-content-fyp
[https://perma.cc/KC34-P2EQ] (“TikTok is changing its For You Page algorithm to prevent users from
seeing too many similar videos that could be harmful when viewed in clusters . . . .”).
115
See, e.g., Brian G. Southwell, Jeff Nierderdeppe, Joseph N. Cappella, Anna Gaysynsky, Dannielle
E. Kelley, April Oh, Emily B. Peterson & Wen-Ying Sylvia Chou, Misinformation as a Misunderstood
Challenge to Public Health, 57 AM. J. PREVENTATIVE HEALTH 282 (2019) (arguing that mis- and
disinformation presents “core systemic challenges that public health and medical professionals [must]
face in protecting and improving population health”).
116
See DAVID S. ARDIA, EVAN RINGEL, VICTORIA SMITH EKSTRAND & ASHLEY FOX, ADDRESSING
THE DECLINE OF LOCAL NEWS, RISE OF PLATFORMS, AND SPREAD OF MIS- AND DISINFORMATION
ONLINE: A SUMMARY OF CURRENT RESEARCH AND POLICY PROPOSALS 31 (2020),
https://citap.unc.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/20665/2020/12/Local-News-Platforms-and-MisDisinformation.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZGF9-YJMJ] (“Moreover, social media platforms are designed to
disseminate content through algorithms that ‘can modify patterns of individual exposure in opaque ways,’
causing different people to see and hear different content.”).
117
See generally Cohen, Exploring Echo-Systems, supra note 18.
118
See supra notes 1–19 and accompanying text. The story of Caleb Cain illustrates this very point.
As described in the introduction, Caleb Cain was once a young and impressionable man who sympathized
with identity rights, feminism, and other liberal ideological commitments, but YouTube’s
recommendation decisions fed him a consistent stream of mis- and disinformation. This content helped
him make sense of the world as he saw it, becoming his truth, although much of the recommendations
helped reinforce a false and radical narrative of the world.
114
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as do end users’ preferences.119 This is necessarily an incremental change
occurring through repeated exposure to relevant mis- and disinformation
until users’ attitudes stray far enough to alter their previous behaviors and
beliefs. This process of radicalization can lead to even poorer consequences
in society, such as “weakened group ties, a lack of adherence to social norms,
fragmentation of identity, and purposelessness.”120 Sometimes, it may even
lead to tragic death.121
The problem of mis- and disinformation is made worse by the fact that
it is quite stubborn.122 Studies have repeatedly shown that when end users are
confronted by demonstrably true but opposing viewpoints, they double down
on their false beliefs. 123 Thus, content-based solutions like content
moderation tend to be ineffective, as well as expensive, over- and
underinclusive, and legally presumed invalid as a regulatory modality.124
Further, calling out disinformants merely emboldens such actors and
amplifies the spread of mis- and disinformation. For example, disinformation
campaigns “did not stop once Russia’s IRA was caught interfering in the
2016 election.125 Instead, engagement with disinformation increased and the
range of “public policy issues, national security issues, and issues pertinent
to younger voters” merely broadened in response to the negative press.126
Thus, speaker-based solutions tend to exacerbate the problem. Given the
difficulty of curbing the harmful effects of mis- and disinformation after
119

See Ribeiro et al., supra note 3, at 140.
Marwick & Lewis, Media Manipulation, supra note 16, at 29.
121
Dylann Roof’s attack on a historic black church in 2015 resulted in the deaths of nine African
Americans and “was predicated by his radicalization into white nationalism through his internet habits.”
See Cohen, Exploring Echo-Systems, supra note 18, at 146 (“Crowd-based judgments about relevance
can create information cascades that lend sensationalized, false, and hatred-inciting online material
extraordinary staying power.”).
122
Cohen, Platform Economy, supra note 63, at 149.
123
Jared Wadley, New Study Analyzes Why People Are Resistant to Correcting Misinformation,
Offers Solutions, U. MICH. NEWS (Sept. 20, 2012), http://ns.umich.edu/new/releases/20768-new-studyanalyzes-why-people-are-resistant-to-correcting-misinformation-offers-solutions
[https://perma.cc/7RM5-7J5Y].
124
Klonick, supra note 26, at 1631–32 (describing platforms’ use of both an expensive yet vague
standards-based approach and a cheap yet over- and underinclusive approach to content moderation). See
generally John Samples, Why the Government Should Not Regulate Content Moderation of Social Media,
CATO INST. (Apr. 9, 2019), https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/why-government-should-not-regulatecontent-moderation-social-media [https://perma.cc/6CMJ-S7Y3] (arguing against content moderation
regulation because the First Amendment likely precludes such regulation and “tech firms appear
determined to deal with such harms, leaving little for the government to do”).
125
PHILIP HOWARD, BHARATH GANESH, DIMITRA LIOTSIOU, JOHN KELLY & CAMILLE FRANÇOIS,
THE IRA, SOCIAL MEDIA AND POLITICAL POLARIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 2012-2018 3 (2018),
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1004&context=senatedocs
[https://perma.cc/Y7FX-WSXL].
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publication and exposure, an architecture-based solution curbing exposure
before it happens would be promising.127
B. Addiction and Mental Health
Recommendation decisions also play a crucial role in facilitating social
media addiction and related mental health harm among a variety of end
users.128 The way recommendation decisions produce social media addiction
is similar to the way they spread mis- and disinformation: content is curated
based on the very same engagement drivers that result in behavioral
addictive tendencies among end users. More specifically, personalization
algorithms peddle content that is predicted to give the end user pleasure or
satisfaction, which are the very same factors that keep end users coming back
for more.129 Although other factors like graphical user interface optimization
and differential reward interval timing also facilitate social media addiction,
the content that is curated specifically to produce increasing levels of social
media use is fundamental to increasing platform engagement and thus
keeping users hooked.130
This process can lead to a bona fide addiction to social media use.131
There is no firm consensus on sufficiently problematic social media use as
to constitute an addiction, 132 but one longstanding theoretical model has
127

See infra Section IV.B.1; cf. Klonick, supra note 26, at 1603 (“The first solution to this problem
should . . . [come] from simple changes to the architecture and governance systems put in place by these
platforms.”).
128
See, e.g., Rosenquist et al., supra note 30, at 444 (suggesting that personalization algorithms allow
social media platforms to be more appealing to users such that “social media is the source of much of the
malicious content that is hypothesized to be a key cause of mental health harm”).
129
See id.
130
See id. at 444, 446.
131
Framing problematic social media use as a bona fide addiction could be said to diminish the
gravity of other addictions such as those based on substance abuse. Cf. ADAM ALTER, IRRESISTIBLE: THE
RISE OF ADDICTIVE TECHNOLOGY AND THE BUSINESS OF KEEPING US HOOKED 3–4 (2017) (“We tend to
think of addiction as something inherent in certain people—those we label addicts.”). However, social
media addiction is similar to the addiction induced by gambling. Id. at 5–6 (mentioning gambling and
other addictive activities such as online shopping and email). In fact, the criteria used for operationalizing
social media addiction are adapted from the criteria used for diagnosing pathological gambling. See
Eduardo Guedes, Federica Sancassiani, Mauro Giovani Carta, Carlos Campos, Sergio Machado, Anna
Lucia Spear King & Antonio Egidio Nardi, Internet Addiction and Excessive Social Networks Use: What
About Facebook?, 12 CLINICAL PRAC. & EPIDEM. MENTAL HEALTH 43, 45 (2016) (“The Internet
Addiction Scale . . . was developed by adapting DSM-IV criteria for pathological gambling, a diagnosis
classified as an impulse-control disorder.”).
132
See, e.g., Cecilie Schou Andreassen, Ståle Pallesen & Mark D. Griffiths, The Relationship
Between Addictive Use of Social Media, Narcissism, and Self-Esteem: Findings from a Large National
Survey, 64 ADDICTIVE BEHAVS. 287, 287–88 (2017) (“The term ‘Internet addiction’ has been criticized
for being too unspecific in terms of content.”); Vahid Khosravani, Marcantonio M. Spada, Farangis
Sharifi Bastan & Seyed Mehdi Samimi Ardestani, The Desire Thinking Questionnaire-Persian Version
(DTQ-P)
and
Its
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defined social media addiction using six criteria.133 A social media addiction
may be characterized as (1) increased preoccupation or content consumption;
(2) the use of social media to reduce negative feelings; (3) the gradual
tolerance to pleasure derived from consumption; (4) distress or discomfort
from nonuse; (5) impairment or harm in daily life as a result of social media
use; and (6) consistent failures to control social media use.134 According to
this theoretical model, “any behavior (e.g., social networking) that fulfills
the aforementioned six criteria can be operationally defined as an
addiction.”135
Research has found that all six of these criteria positively correlate with
end users who show signs of narcissism and low self-esteem. 136 This finding
suggests that addiction may arise when recommendation decisions satisfy an
end user’s all too human need for self-importance and self-affirmation
towards increasing levels. 137 Other research has substantiated the same
phenomenon of social media addiction from general societal trends.138 Time
spent on social media has been growing at an accelerating rate.139 Further,
survey data shows that relapse is increasingly prevalent among significant
populations of end users who express a desire to reduce their use.140 Thus,
these two general trends—the exponential rise of use and the increasing
prevalence of relapse—suggest that social media consumption can, and has,
become addictive.141
Social media’s addictive qualities also tend to disproportionately
impact vulnerable populations. Young, single girls are more likely to develop
problematic social media usage. 142 Indeed, in late 2021, an internal study
Association
with
Addictive
Behaviors
in
Individuals
with
Alcohol
Use
Disorder, Nicotine Dependence, and Problematic Social Media Use, 125 ADDICTIVE BEHAVS. 2 (2022)
(“In the literature, there is no general agreement on a specific scale having a cut-off point detecting
individuals with problematic social media use”).
133
See Khosravani et al., supra note 132, at 3.
134
See Andreassen et al., supra note 132, at 288.
135
M.D. Griffiths, D.J. Kuss & Z. Demetrovics, Social Networking Addiction: An Overview of
Preliminary Findings, BEHAV. ADDICTIONS 119, 121 (2014); see also Khosravani et al., supra note 132,
at 3.
136
See Andreassen et al., supra note 132, at 287.
137
Id. (“Although most effect sizes were relatively modest, the findings supported the notion of
addictive social media use reflecting a need to feed the ego (i.e., narcissistic personality traits) and an
attempt to inhibit a negative self-evaluation (i.e., self-esteem).”). The type of content that would fulfill
the need for self-importance and self-affirmation would be, for example, humiliating fails, relatable skits,
roasting, and aggressive political commentary.
138
Rosenquist et al., supra note 30, at 445.
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
Id.
142
Andreassen et al., supra note 132, at 287.
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conducted by Facebook (now Meta) showed that Instagram use resulted in
body image issues and other mental health problems among adolescent and
teenage girls.143 Further, there is a growing body of evidence that suggests
that, “[w]hile the benefits seem to be generally higher among younger, better
educated, and the White racial/ethnic groups, the harms seem to be higher
among older, less educated, and minority racial/ethnic groups.”144
Although recommendation decisions drive engagement with content
that tends to exacerbate adolescent mental health, there is evidence that
positive (active) engagement with such content, such as commenting on
others posts, alleviates users’ feeling of inadequacy. 145 However, when
adolescent social media use is moderate to high, increases in positive use
correlate with increases in loneliness over time.146 Thus, even though some
active use can be beneficial to adolescents and perhaps other at-risk
populations, extensive use would still result in harm to users’ well-being.147
Yet, users may find it difficult to escape such harm to their well-being when
recommendation decisions foster engagement with addictive content at
increasing levels.
In sum, although no solid consensus has emerged on the topic of
addiction and other mental health hazards arising from social media use, the
topic itself has become increasingly salient in our society. Much of this
discourse around the addictive effects of social media deals with graphical
user interface optimization and differential reward interval timing, but the

143
Jonathan Haidt, The Dangerous Experiment on Teen Girls, ATLANTIC (Nov. 21, 2021),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/11/facebooks-dangerous-experiment-teen-girls/620767/
[https://perma.cc/FP4G-N77E]. In many ways, this news was worrisome but not surprising, since
Instagram is the one platform where user-generated content primarily consists of pictures showing
dazzling lifestyles, glittering material possessions, and heteronormative body figures. LEV MANOVICH,
INSTAGRAM AND CONTEMPORARY IMAGE 111, 126 (2017) (arguing that Instagram promotes an aesthetic
society where “production and presentation of beautiful images, experiences, styles, and user interaction
designs is central for its economic and social functioning” and “strong rules one has to follow to attract
many followers” emerges). A culture of content showcasing traditional notions of wealth and beauty will
naturally exacerbate feelings of inadequacy in at-risk youth.
144
Mesfin A. Bekalu, Rachel F. McCloud & K. Viswanath, Association of Social Media Use with
Social Well-Being, Positive Mental Health, and Self-Rated Health: Disentangling Routine Use from
Emotional Connection To Use, 46 HEALTH EDUC. & BEHAV. 69, 78 (2019).
145
Id. at 70–71.
146
Kexin Wanga, Eline Frison, Steven Eggermont & Laura Vandenbosch, Active Public Facebook
Use and Adolescents’ Feelings of Loneliness: Evidence for a Curvilinear Relationship, 67 J.
ADOLESCENCE 35, 42 (2018) (explaining that this relationship may be the result of heavy active Facebook
use displacing real-life social connections as well as the fact that “heavy Facebook users might feel
lonelier because they are the most prone to engage in social comparison processes”).
147
Cf. id. (understanding that the U-shaped relationship between active Facebook use and social and
emotional loneliness suggested the “desensitization, habituation and ceiling effects” from increasing
social media use that was once effective in alleviating social and emotional loneliness).
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other kind of addictive feature worth our attention is the platform’s ability to
render addictive recommendation decisions for masses of end users.
C. Privacy and Autonomy Harms
The erosion of individual privacy and autonomy through technological
innovations like social media has seen extensive coverage in recent years.148
However, the way in which recommendation decisions in particular erode
these interests have not yet been the subject of robust conversation. Only
when we understand the broader implications such decisions have on privacy
and autonomy are we able to further contextualize the problems of mis- and
disinformation and social media addiction.
As mentioned above, recommendation decisions themselves are a
means of gathering data.149 The quality and quantity of user engagement with
these decisions are a valuable source of direct feedback on the quality of its
recommendations.150 Data gathering innovations like mouse and eye tracking,
coupled with traditional notions of user engagement like watch time, likes,
topics, and more, allow platforms to gain insight on whether an end user’s
recommendation decisions are properly keeping their attention and driving
their engagement. Not only do these curation decisions themselves offer
many different kinds of data points on user engagement. They also offer
significant amounts of data on users. On YouTube, recommendation
decisions drive eighty-one percent of content consumption.151 On platforms
like Facebook, Instagram, and TikTok, the percentage is higher, since the
entire user experience is predicated on personalized content consumption.152

148
See, e.g., Cohen, Platform Economy, supra note 63, at 141 (explaining the datafication of
everyday life); THE SOCIAL DILEMMA (Exposure Labs & Argent Pictures 2020) (explaining how social
media platforms use vast troves of data on hundreds of millions of users to optimize their systems); Will
Thomas DeVries, Protecting Privacy in the Digital Age, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 283 passim (2003)
(noticing an erosion of privacy and autonomy in the digital age across “the three branches of privacy
law”).
149
Cohen, Exploring Echo-Systems, supra note 18, at 142.
150
Id. at 141 (“Over the entire length of time a user participates on social media or media sites, the
small actions and digital interactions, such as likes, comments, ratings, reads, views, and shares, are
accumulated into large mathematical databases.”).
151
Patrick Van Kessel, 10 Facts About Americans and YouTube, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Dec. 4, 2019),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/12/04/10-facts-about-americans-and-youtube/
[https://perma.cc/HPS9-M5EC].
152
Facebook’s user experience primarily centers around algorithmically curating updates from
friends and family, news articles, videos, and other media through its tabs. Instagram primarily feeds its
users content, first, from those the user is following, and then algorithmically curated posts from others.
TikTok’s whole popularity hinges on giving users easy access to an infinite stream of recommended
videos. For more information on Facebook usage trends in America, see John Gramlich, 10 Facts About
Americans and Facebook, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 1, 2021), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2021/06/01/facts-about-americans-and-facebook/ [https://perma.cc/QEV6-TD3W].
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Simply put, the more users consume content through recommendation
decisions, the more data the platform can gather on its users.153 And because
of the quality and quantity of the data collected, platforms are able make
highly-sensitive inferences that users themselves would feel uncomfortable
sharing to others, such as religious preferences and health conditions.154
Moreover, recommendation decisions provide platforms an incentive to
gather data. These decisions are only as good as the data informing them.155
Thus, platforms require more data on end users and their content preferences
so that their recommendation decisions remain relevant. And if platforms’
recommendation decisions stay relevant, as they are designed to be, then
platforms see greater engagement, attention, and inevitably monetary gain.156
Thus, the successful functioning of recommendations is a powerful incentive
to further erode privacy.
However, what flows from the erosion of privacy through
recommendation decisions is the reduction of end user autonomy, namely
violence to the end user’s beliefs and the contortion of their psyche.
Recommendation decisions end up driving end users toward predicted
outcomes, namely consuming problematic content, rather than being driven
by end users towards users’ preferred outcomes.
In sum, recommendation decisions play different roles in different
contexts. In the context of mis- and disinformation and social media
addiction, they are nefarious because they use the very same engagement
drivers that make the curation decisions problematic. In the context of
privacy and autonomy harms, however, they act as both a means and an
incentive to gather user data, driving end users away from themselves and
toward the platform’s desired outcomes. Although recommendation
decisions play different roles in all three contexts, if they are platform speech,
then empowering users to confront such speech through architectural, legal,
market-based, and normative means should alleviate all three phenomena in
one fell swoop.

153
See, e.g., Emily A. Vogels, The Longer and More Often People Use Facebook, the More Ad
Preferences the Site Lists About Them, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Dec. 3, 2019),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/12/03/facebook-ad-preferences-linked-to-frequency-ofuse-age-of-account/ [https://perma.cc/Y26Q-R8SB].
154
Claire Dolin, Ben Weinshel, Shawn Shan, Chang Min Hahn, Euirim Choi, Michelle L. Mazurek
& Blase Ur, Unpacking Perceptions of Data-Driven Inferences Underlying Online Targeting and
Personalization, in CHI ‘18: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2018 CHI CONFERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS IN
COMPUTING SYSTEMS 1, 8 (2018).
155
See supra notes 57–62.
156
See supra notes 63–65.
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III. USER PERSONALIZATION AS A COUNTERSPEECH SOLUTION
Consistent with free speech values, if recommendation decisions are
platform speech, then the constitutionally preferred method for combating
problematic recommendation decisions is end user counterspeech. In the
digital space, this primarily occurs via user personalization tools. These tools
offer end users individualized control and influence over recommendation
decisions. Thus, personalization tools may be fertile regulatory ground for
encouraging expressive combat from the bottom-up. Section III.A briefly
explains the counterspeech doctrine. Section III.B establishes why
personalization tools enable end user counterspeech against recommendation
decisions.
A. Counterspeech Doctrine
The counterspeech doctrine stands for the premise that the
constitutionally preferred method of overcoming harmful, injurious, false, or
otherwise problematic speech is more speech (i.e., counterspeech). 157 As
Justice Brandeis famously articulated, “If there be time to expose through
discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of
education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.”158
This is because truth, and in fact democracy itself,159 flourishes if information
can flow freely like water and where ideas can battle for acceptance.160 Thus,
the Supreme Court has endorsed counterspeech as the first remedy against
false statements such as those that cause reputational harm.161 The Court has
also used the doctrine to invalidate government restrictions on false speech
itself, especially when the legislating state is attempting to protect its citizens
from certain kinds of information.162
In pursuit of this ideal, modern scholarly discourse has conceptualized
counterspeech as expression that directly responds to or undermines
problematic speech such as false, harmful, or injurious statements, images,

157
Robert D. Richards & Clay Calvert, Counterspeech 2000: A New Look at the Old Remedy for
“Bad” Speech, 2000 B.Y.U. L. REV. 553, 553.
158
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
159
See generally Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Free Speech: And Its Relation to Self-Government. by
Alexander Meiklejohn. New York: Harper & Bros. 1948. Pp.107. $2.00, 62 HARV. L. REV. 891, 896 (1949)
(placing governance by the governed and political speech at the heart of the First Amendment).
160
See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[T]he ultimate
good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of the thought
to get itself accepted in the competition of the market . . . .”).
161
Richards & Calvert, supra note 157, at 554.
162
United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 728 (2012) (invalidating the Stolen Valor Act, a law that
prohibited mere false claims of military decorations, because the First Amendment ensures the right to
engage in civil discourse).
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or other communications.163 Some scholars would include in this definition
any speech that has incidental countereffects against problematic speech,
such as public educational campaigns. 164 Further, given the rise in
problematic speech in the information era, counterspeech has seen increasing
attention and popularity as a regulatory solution to extreme and dangerous
speech.165
Although the counterspeech doctrine rests on many assumptions, 166
three deserve special attention. First, the doctrine assumes individuals can
distinguish between truth and falsehoods. 167 Just as consumers in an
economic market can distinguish goods by quality, so too can individuals in
the marketplace of ideas differentiate ideas by truth.168 Second, for truth to
eventually prevail, individuals must “place greater value on true news and
information than they do on false information.”169 Otherwise, adding more
speech may promote the very information that counterspeech purports to
extinguish. Third, the doctrine posits that counterspeech is most effective as
a means towards truth only upon a wide and robust discussion of ideas.170
These three assumptions are worth presenting here because of their potential
as sources for counterarguments against user personalization inputs as a form
of counterspeech.171
B. User Personalization Tools as Counterspeech
Counterspeech is great, but exactly what form does it take when
countering problematic recommendation decisions? Clearly, scholars172 and
other stakeholders 173 engage in counterspeech when they raise an alarm
163

See Susan Benesch, Derek Ruths, Kelly P. Dillon, Haji Mohammad Saleem & Lucas Wright,
Counterspeech on Twitter: A Field Study, DANGEROUS SPEECH PROJECT 5 (Oct. 14, 2016) [hereinafter
Benesch, Counterspeech on Twitter], https://dangerousspeech.org/counterspeech-on-twitter-a-fieldstudy/ [https://perma.cc/45L5-NZGZ].
164
Id.
165
See Cathy Buerger, Counterspeech: A Literature Review, DANGEROUS SPEECH PROJECT 1 (June
16, 2021), https://dangerousspeech.org/counterspeech-a-literature-review/ [https://perma.cc/9LD6HAKY].
166
See Phillip N. Napoli, What if More Speech is No Longer the Solution? First Amendment Theory
Meets Fake News and the Filter Bubble, 70 FED. COMMC’N L.J. 55, 61 (2018).
167
Id. (“[T]here is the assumption that individuals are capable of discerning between true and false
information.”).
168
See id.
169
Id.
170
See Richards & Calvert, supra note 157, at 556. (“[C]ounterspeech is most effective when its
proponents are able to call journalistic attention to their message, place it on the media’s agenda, and
thereby exponentially increase the audience to whom the message is disseminated.”).
171
See infra Section III.C.
172
See Cohen, Platform Economy, supra note 63, at 141.
173
See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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against platforms and their invisible tendency to personalize, and privatize,
the user experience. On occasion, these public efforts between platforms and
stakeholders have helped create change.174 The other form of counterspeech
is more private, direct, and frequent than public criticism and advocacy by
scholars and stakeholders. It is the end user’s own personalization inputs,
specifically the tools that an end user uses to control or influence their
experience with a platform.
Personalization tools are the primary means by which end users can
directly control or influence a platform’s recommendation decisions. 175
These tools consist of content engagement inputs, like empathizing,
commenting, or favoriting content; hiding particular posts or advertisements;
following, unfollowing, or blocking specific end users; and following or
subscribing to forums, end users, and topics of interest.176 As platforms have
acknowledged, user inputs are valuable because they can help refine the
platform’s recommendation decisions.177
174

See, e.g., Roose, Conspiracy Theory Boom, supra note 7; Julia Angwin, Madeleine Varner &
Ariana Tobin, Facebook Enabled Advertisers to Reach ‘Jew Haters,’ PROPUBLICA (Sept. 14, 2017),
https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-enabled-advertisers-to-reach-jew-haters
[https://perma.cc/ZD4Q-KBLX] (“After being contacted by ProPublica, Facebook removed several antiSemitic ad categories and promised to improve monitoring.”).
175
See, e.g., Community Standards, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/
[https://perma.cc/Y2FX-HZFH] (assuring that the platform allows users “control over their own
experience by allowing them to block, unfollow or hide people and posts” as a countermeasure against
content, which acts in concert with its own moderation system against harmful, offensive, injurious, or
false content that may or may not violate its Community Standards). To be clear, this is not to imply that
all personalization tools confer direct control over recommendation decisions. Some do not (e.g., liking
a post). This is also not to say that these tools are the only factors that control or influence recommendation
decisions. They are not (e.g., post recency). However, the term “personalization tool” does suggest
product features, switches, or controls that allow user input and affect a platform’s recommendation
decisions for that particular end user.
176
See, e.g., Facebook, How Do I Hide a Post That Appears in My Facebook News Feed?,
FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/268028706671439?ref=ccs
[https://perma.cc/8VHXMMVV] (instructing end users on how to hide a post and unfollow a specific person for 30 days or
indefinitely); Manage Your Recommendations and Search Results, GOOGLE [hereinafter Google, Manage
Your
Recommendations],
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/6125535?hl=en&ref_topic=9257501&co=GENIE.Platform
%3DDesktop&oco=1 [https://perma.cc/5TND-66AD] (informing end users about several ways to
“influence [your] recommendations and search results,” including a “Not Interested” and “Don’t
Recommend Channel” input on curated content); Customizing Your Twitter Experience, TWITTER,
https://help.twitter.com/en/safety-and-security/control-your-twitter-experience [https://perma.cc/WT3BEDXW].
177
See, e.g., Google, Manage Your Recommendations, supra note 176 (“Your activity . . . may
influence your YouTube search results, recommendations on the home page, in-app notifications, and
suggested videos among other places.”); What Are Recommendations on Facebook?, FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/help/1257205004624246 [https://perma.cc/A8XB-DL89] (“Our goal is to
make recommendations that are relevant and valuable to each person who sees them.”); How TikTok
Recommends Videos #ForYou, TIKTOK, https://newsroom.tiktok.com/en-us/how-tiktok-recommendsvideos-for-you [https://perma.cc/6VS5-SXWU] (“Ultimately, your For You feed is powered by your
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Of course, in order to count as counterspeech, an end user’s
personalization inputs must represent the end user’s expression. Courts have
already largely decided they do. In Bland v. Roberts,178 the Fourth Circuit has
held that “liking” a Facebook page constitutes “pure speech” under the First
Amendment.179 Facebook provided the Court with an explanation of what a
“Like” means on its platform:
The “Like” button on Facebook, represented by a thumbs-up icon, is a way for
Users to share information on Facebook. . . . By clicking the Like button, a
Facebook User generates an announcement known as a “Like story” that is
posted to her Profile (now Timeline) page. For example, if Jane Smith Liked
the UNICEF Facebook Page, the statement “Jane Smith likes UNICEF” would
appear on her Profile page along with the title of the Page and an icon selected
by the Page’s administrator. The Page’s title and icon function as an Internet
link: another Facebook User who views the User’s Profile can click on them
and be taken to the Page. If Jane Smith Liked an article on CNN’s website about
UNICEF’s activity in sub-Saharan Africa, the statement “Jane Smith likes this
article” would appear with a link to the article.180

The Court reasoned that liking a Page communicated a bona fide
statement of the end user’s approval.181 Further, the “universally understood
‘thumbs up’ symbol” in connection to a Page conveyed the end user’s
message of approval.182 Other courts have followed suit.183
Although one may argue that Bland concerned only the “Like” button,
the “Like” button is merely emblematic of the broader range of expressive
user personalization inputs. The Bland Court found no constitutional
significance between the single click of a “Like” and the multiple clicks of a
written statement of approval.184 One may also argue that the “Like” button
is speech only because it published a public message of the end user’s
approval. Thus, personalization inputs count as speech only when
communicated publicly and to other end users. However, this argument also
fails. The size and purpose of an audience has no bearing on whether
feedback: the system is designed to continuously improve, correct, and learn from your own engagement
with the platform . . . .”).
178
730 F.3d 368 (4th Cir. 2013).
179
Id. at 386.
180
Brief for Facebook, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant at 5, Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d
368 (4th Cir. 2013) (No. 12-1671).
181
Bland, 730 F.3d at 386.
182
Id.
183
See Rainsy v. Facebook, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 3d 1101, 1114–15 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (holding that
liking a Page conveyed an end user’s approval).
184
Bland, 730 F.3d at 386 (“That a user may use a single mouse click to produce that message that
he likes the page instead of typing the same message with several individual key strokes is of no
constitutional significance.”).
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something counts as expression. A book is still a book if read only by the
editor or by millions of readers. As a “Like” is still a like if communicated
only to the platform itself or to millions of end users. 185 This reasoning
logically extends to other personalization inputs as well.
Platforms themselves should agree with this assessment. For instance,
Facebook publicly supports counterspeech as a means to flush out racism,
violence, and other extreme content—when such speech makes headlines or
appears in users’ personal feeds.186 Further, Facebook suggests, in addition
to the platform’s control over content moderation decisions, end users can
benefit by exercising control over Facebook’s recommendation decisions
through various personalization tools.187 In this way, Facebook recognizes
that personalization tools provide end users expressive control where the
platform cannot control, or has not bothered to control, the recommendation
decisions primarily rendered in pursuit of its predictive engagement
strategies.
Facebook is not alone in recognizing the value of end user
personalization inputs. After TikTok faced increased scrutiny for “push[ing]
young users down rabbit holes of sex and drugs, showing similar content
repeatedly,” TikTok quickly announced its development of “more ways [for
end users] to customize what content isn’t shown to them,” including
keyword and hashtag filters. 188 TikTok therefore also sees value in
personalization inputs as useful counterspeech. In sum, just as a platform
speaks through recommendation decisions, so does an end user through
personalization tools. Their inputs help change, correct, and influence the
platform’s predictions. Personalization tools, in other words, are an end
user’s personal countermeasures against the expressive power of the
platform’s recommendation decisions.

185

Cf., e.g., Benjamin, supra note 26, at 1461 (“Communication thus seems to require, at a minimum,
a speaker who seeks to transmit some substantive message or messages to a listener who can recognize
that message.”).
186
Supporting the Voices That Are Engaged in Counterspeech, FACEBOOK [hereinafter Facebook,
Supporting the Voices], https://counterspeech.fb.com/en/ [https://perma.cc/4CA9-TDT2] (“As a
community, a social platform, and a gathering of the shared human experience, Facebook supports critical
Counterspeech initiatives by enforcing strong content policies and working alongside local communities,
policymakers, experts, and changemakers to unleash Counterspeech initiatives across the globe.”).
187
Community Standards, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/
[https://perma.cc/Y2FX-HZFH] (“People can report potentially violating content, including Pages,
Groups, Profiles, individual content, and comments. We also give people control over their own
experience by allowing them to block, unfollow or hide people and posts.”).
188
Sato, supra note 114. Although TikTok is working on a feature that allows users to filter their
feed by keywords and hashtags, id., for reasons discussed in Section IV.A, these keyword-oriented filters
alone cannot adequately counter the platform’s harmful recommendation decisions.
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Since personalization inputs double as an end user’s own counterspeech,
a regulatory focus on enhancing those inputs would be promising.
Counterspeech remains constitutionally preferred, 189 and platforms
themselves have also demonstrated support for counterspeech solutions.190 A
regulatory focus on personalization tools not only helps enhance
counterspeech capabilities, thereby bolstering user participation with the
platform and content itself; it also injects more speech into the digital public
sphere, unlike a regulatory focus on content removal or moderation.191 Thus,
mis- and disinformation, as pernicious as it may be, as well as addictive
content and harms to privacy and autonomy, should be dealt with
affirmatively so that we might best uphold core First Amendment values.
Therefore, regulating personalization tools would be low-hanging fruit as a
counterspeech solution to curbing the spread of harmful online content.
C. Doctrinal Implications
Should we accept the proposition that end user inputs via
personalization tools constitute end user counterspeech against a particular
platform’s recommendation decisions, one may still hesitate to find
personalization tools to be an effective solution, given the assumptions of the
counterspeech doctrine. However, as I explain below, none of these
theoretical concerns substantially weaken the viability of user
personalization tools as an effective form of countering a platform’s
recommendation decisions.
1. Inability to Distinguish Speech
One may argue that neither users nor platforms may be able to
distinguish between true and false, harmful and innocuous, problematic or
unproblematic content.192 Admittedly, assessing the veracity of certain types
of content can be difficult. For example, deepfakes have become increasingly
tricky to spot.193 However, end users, platforms, and researchers continue to
189

See supra Section III.A.
See, e.g., Facebook, Supporting the Voices, supra note 186. In addition to leveraging users to
police their recommendation decisions, platforms may also find end user personalization tools attractive
because they further distance the platform as a speaker from its recommendation decisions, thereby
limiting liability for third-party content, and advance the technological motif of democratization (of news
media).
191
Cf. Klonick, supra note 26, at 1603, 1666 (“[T]he biggest threat this private system of governance
poses to democratic culture is the loss of a fair opportunity to participate, which is compounded by the
system’s lack of direct accountability to its users.”).
192
This counterargument takes inspiration from the first assumption presented in Section III.A. See
supra note 167 and accompanying text (“First, the doctrine assumes individuals can distinguish between
truth and falsehoods.”).
193
See Matthew Groh, Ziv Epstein, Chaz Firestone & Rosalind Picard, Deepfake Detection by
Human Crowds, Machines, and Machine-Informed Crowds, 119 PNAS 1, 1 (2022). Deepfakes are videos
190
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work together to develop new ways to detect this synthetic content with
substantial accuracy. 194 Although developing new strategies to counteract
false content should not be taken for granted, the example of deepfakes
illustrates that users, platforms, and other stakeholders do have the ability to
detect increasingly complicated forms of false speech. Indeed, platforms
have been able to identify, index, and demote problematic content not only
based on their own intervention195 but also that of their users.196
2. Value for Falsehood over Truth
Further, one may argue that personalization tools are not worthy of our
attention because the average end user tends to value the false, harmful, and
addictive more than the true, benign, and moderate.197 Thus, personalization
inputs would merely allow users to filter—deliberately or subconsciously—
towards the bad, thereby allowing the platform to promote the very speech
their inputs should seek to extinguish as a counterspeech solution.
However, this hesitation is again misplaced for two reasons. First, users
engage with content for all sorts of reasons, from entertainment to education.
In fact, a vast majority of users use social media primarily for educational
purposes, such as learning how to do things, buying products, and staying

manufactured by neural network models to make one person appear to say something that another person
said by swapping or altering their face with the original face depicted. Id.
194
See id. at 1, 5 (finding that “human-AI collaboration” increased accuracy from 66% to 73%).
195
See Roose, Conspiracy Theory Boom, supra note 7 (“[P]latforms like YouTube and Facebook . . .
ha[ve] also pledged to clean up misinformation that could lead to real world harm . . . .”); Yoel Roth &
Nick Pickles, Updating Our Approach to Misleading Information, TWITTER (May 11, 2020),
https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/product/2020/updating-our-approach-to-misleadinginformation.html [https://perma.cc/Y4J3-X53G]; Danny Goodwin, Facebook Adds Disputed Alert To
Fight Fake News, SEARCH ENGINE J. (Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.searchenginejournal.com/facebookdisputed-content/188809/#close [https://perma.cc/8BSZ-QZ9B] (reporting that Facebook has marked
mis- and disinformation as “disputed”).
196
See,
e.g.,
Report
Inappropriate
Content,
YOUTUBE,
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2802027?hl=en&ref_topic=9387085
[https://perma.cc/2JGC-XDLZ] (explaining that YouTube relies on its users to report content as
inappropriate so that the platform can mark that content for age restriction); Sensitive Media Policy,
TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/media-policy [https://perma.cc/DN2Y-LWDT]
(explaining that the platform relies on end users to mark sensitive content as such so that it can place
“images and videos behind an interstitial (or warning message)”).
197
Soroush Vosoughi, Deb Roy & Sinan Aral, The Spread of True and False News Online, 356
SCIENCE 1146, 1146 (2018) (finding that false information diffused faster, farther, deeper, and more
broadly than truth in all categories of information); Rosenquist et al., supra note 30, at 442 (arguing social
media platforms tend to cause behavioral addictive tendencies among end users). This counterargument
parallels the second assumption presented in Section III.A. See supra note 169 and accompanying text
(“Second, for truth to eventually prevail, individuals must ‘place greater value on true news and
information than they do on false information.’”).
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informed. 198 Thus, average engagement is far less likely to prioritize
problematic content. Second, even if one believes users prioritize harmful
content consumption, at least giving users an adequate ability to reject
harmful content would serve society better than the alternative. This is
because if users had counterspeech-level control, they could effectively
reject problematic content.199 On the other hand, if users continue to have the
same level of control as they do now, they would consume problematic
content at the same levels as before—just without an opportunity to
adequately control problematic recommendation decisions.200
3. Private Speech as Counterspeech
Lastly, one may argue that user personalization inputs are private
communications—one between the end user and the platform—whereas the
traditional conception of counterspeech posits a public communication—one
among stakeholders in the marketplace of ideas.201 Yet, there are two reasons
why this argument fails. First, the expressive dynamic at issue is not a public
dynamic at heart. 202 Since the platform produces problematic private
speech, 203 the user should be able to produce corrective private
counterspeech. Plus, despite the private nature of the users’ counterspeech,
the user’s private inputs are effective and direct countermeasures against
false, harmful, and otherwise problematic recommendation decisions. Thus,
although counterspeech usually takes place publicly, 204 it can also do so
privately between the user and platform.
Second, user personalization invariably does affect the modern digital
public sphere in real ways. An individual user’s personalization inputs not
only influence recommendation decisions concerning other users205 but also
198

See, e.g., Smith et al., Many Turn to YouTube, supra note 27; Anita Whiting & David Williams,
Why People Use Social Media: A Uses and Gratifications Approach, 16 QUALITATIVE MKT. RSCH. 362,
366 (2013).
199
Cf. George Berry & Sean J. Taylor, Discussion Quality Diffuses in the Digital Public Square, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 26TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON WORLD WIDE WEB 1371-1380 (2017),
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1702.06677 [https://perma.cc/B54T-M5GZ] (finding a positive response effect
among users when exposed to positive content).
200
Therefore, with counterspeech control, a user like Caleb Cain could reject alt-right mis- and
disinformation from his feed as soon as he realizes that such information is false; otherwise, he would be
left with the risk of relapsing—just without adequate control. See generally supra notes 1–13 and
accompanying text.
201
This counterargument parallels with the third assumption presented in Section III.A. See supra
note 170 and accompanying text (“Third, the doctrine posits that counterspeech is most effective as a
means towards truth only upon a wide and robust discussion of ideas.”).
202
See Benesch et al., Counterspeech on Twitter, supra note 163, at 14 (explaining a “one-to-one”
counterspeech exchange may be private and effective).
203
See supra Part II.
204
See Richards & Calvert, supra note 157, at 533.
205
See Cohen, Exploring Echo-Systems, supra note 18, at 141.
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have the capacity to promote or demote content itself.206 Thus, although a
user’s personalization inputs may be private, they also have an effect on the
public.
In sum, personalization tools are analogous to a form of counterspeech
in the digital public sphere. They provide end users with the ability to engage
with and against the platform’s recommendation decisions. Further, although
I have addressed some hesitations that stem from the inherent assumptions
of the counterspeech doctrine, I recognize further discussion may be
warranted. However, at bottom, as long as the counterspeech doctrine
remains a pillar of First Amendment jurisprudence, personalization tools
remain a viable regulatory solution to the problems our society must now
confront.
IV. PURSUING EFFECTIVE USER PERSONALIZATION
There is one more objection that is unrelated to the doctrine of
counterspeech but that has stood the test of time. One may argue that more
powerful personalization tools could exacerbate echo chambers, leading to
increased insulation to novel ideas and differing viewpoints, as well as group
polarization and radicalization.207 This line of thought reaches all the way
back to the 90s with the advent of the Babel Objection: “the concern that
information overload will lead to fragmentation of discourse, polarization,
and the loss of political community.”208
I do not attempt to dispute this fear—as many scholars have done so
already for many years.209 I do, however, believe a tailored approach can
minimize the risk of exacerbating information cocooning while bolstering
the benefit of end user counterspeech in the digital public sphere. To this end,
206
Cf., e.g., Smith et al., Many Turn to YouTube, supra note 27 (showing YouTube’s
recommendation algorithm curating increasingly longer and more popular content).
207
See CASS. R. SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 15, 65 (2001).
208
YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS
MARKETS AND FREEDOM 214 (2006). Diametrically opposed to the Babel Objection is the critique that
the democratizing effects of the Internet leads to concentration or consolidation in infrastructure and
attention, similar to an information economy dominated by mass media. Id.
209
See Marwick, Fake News?, supra note 20, at 486 (providing a comprehensive explanation of
recent scholarly coverage against the filter bubble theory of personalized search results (i.e.,
recommendation decisions)); William H. Dutton, Bianca Reisdorf, Elizabeth Dubois & Grant Blank,
Social Shaping of the Politics of Internet Search and Networking: Moving Beyond Filter Bubbles, Echo
Chambers, and Fake News 5 (Quello Ctr., Working Paper No. 2944191) (2017) (finding that end users
“search for and double check problematic political information, and expose themselves to a variety of
viewpoints”); Eytan Bakshy, Solomon Messing & Lada A. Adamic, Exposure to Ideologically Diverse
News and Opinion on Facebook, 348 SCIENCE 1130, 1131 (2015) (“Although partisans tend to maintain
relationships with like-minded contacts, . . . on average more than 20% of an individual’s Facebook
friends who report an ideological affiliation are from the opposing party, leaving substantial room for
exposure to opposing viewpoints.”).
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Part IV presents viable proposals that would enable platforms and
policymakers to address the expressive power of recommendation decisions.
First, Section IV.A explains exactly how the predominant personalization
tools are failing to meet the needs of end users as speakers with platforms.
Section IV.B focuses on redressing specific deficiencies in those tools
through platform technology, laws, market incentives, and social norms.
A. Inadequacy of Predominant Personalization Tools
Many end users have not seen, touched, or used personalization tools.
A majority of American Facebook users do not understand why content
appears in their Facebook Feed. 210 Over a third believe they have no
control.211 Over two-thirds have not even attempted to influence the content
that appears on their Facebook Feed. 212 Thus, for most end users,
personalization itself remains a mystery, so personalization tools remain
largely ignored. The lack of awareness around end user personalization tools
and how personalization algorithms work suggests that the social norms
around the predominant personalization tools today are inadequate.
Further, consider the current architecture of these tools. The prevailing
set of personalization tools are flawed in four major ways. They confer end
user control over a platform’s recommendation decisions that is largely: (1)
ex post, (2) minimal, (3) preferential (indirect), and (4) speaker-based.
YouTube’s Home Recommendations is a concrete example which
illustrates these four shortcomings.213 For any given video that appears on the
recommendation feed, YouTube allows each end user to remove specific
videos via a “Not Interested” input. 214 In essence, this tool allows an
individual end user to express that they have no interest in the platform’s
recommendation decision, thus filtering out, blocking, and hiding that
specific piece of content. The “Don’t Recommend Channel” input is the
other way end users can directly control YouTube’s personalized video
recommendations.215 This tool allows users to express that they do not wish
to hear from a specific speaker, thus blocking content from a specific channel
or content creator.216 Other than these, end users may avail themselves to

210

See Smith, Many Facebook Users Don’t Understand, supra note 80.
Id.
212
Id.
213
Although I reference YouTube specifically, my observations apply to nearly all platforms, given
the substantial similarity of end user personalization inputs across platforms. See supra note 176 and
accompanying text.
214
Google, Manage Your Recommendations, supra note 176.
215
Id.
216
Id.
211
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liking, disliking, commenting, and watching videos in order to influence
YouTube’s future recommendations.217
No doubt, these tools improve an end user’s experience, but upon closer
inspection, several shortcomings lurk in the shadows. First, since the
platform must initially recommend each video or channel, every instance of
end user control requires initial exposure to curated content and content
creators. Accordingly, end users must risk exposure to counteract the
platform’s recommendation decisions propagating problematic content or
the proponents of such content. In the context of addictive content, this
reality is especially alarming, as the aforementioned dynamic is similar to
requiring a quitting alcoholic to hold a drink in order for the person to reject
the drink.218
Second, the effect of a user’s personalization input is minimal. Only
that particular video or channel is guaranteed to be blocked as a result of each
instance of user input. Indeed, Google confirms this much when instructing
users on how to use its inputs.219 Thus, each input constitutes a minimal,
limited form of expressive control within a vast universe of billions of hours
of third-party content and 31 million content creators. 220 The user must
therefore put in the work—a deterring amount of it—just to create an impact
on the content they receive.221
Third, and relatedly, most user personalization inputs effectively
constitute a preference—not a prohibition—against similar types of content.
Although the “Not Interested” and “Don’t Recommend Channel” inputs
block specific content and content creators, the point at which those inputs
change future the quality of future recommendations is often delayed “as late
as possible.” 222 This strategy, formally called delayed differentiation, is
widely used in industry because it improves efficiency by reducing the

217

See supra notes 59–61 and accompanying text.
Cf. Rosenquist et al., supra note 30, at 439 (arguing that harmful products like “credit cards and
cigarettes are useful product parallels to social media platforms”).
219
Google, Manage Your Recommendations, supra note 176 (instructing users to tap “Not Interested”
to remove specific recommended videos and “Don’t recommend channel” to “make sure that videos from
specific channels don’t show up in your recommendations”).
220
YouTube by the Numbers: Stats, Demographics & Fun Facts, OMNICORE (Jan. 6, 2021),
https://www.omnicoreagency.com/youtube-statistics/ [https://perma.cc/6FSQ-AZ27].
221
For a thread that indicates the typical user experience arising from the minimal power of their
personalization
inputs,
see
Pikachu1001000,
REDDIT,
https://www.reddit.com/r/youtube/comments/b5334l/the_not_interested_button_does_not_work/
[https://perma.cc/BYH8-WZKH].
222
See Mitchell M. Tseng, Yue Wang & Roger J. Jiao, Mass Customization, in CIRP ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF PRODUCTION ENGINEERING 7 (2017).
218
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number of computational steps needed to make recommendations. 223
However, by the same token, it tends to preserve and protect the use of
harmful engagement drivers throughout multiple iterations of end user
personalization inputs. 224 In other words, despite an end user’s efforts to
leverage their personalization inputs to target certain kinds of content, the
platform will continue to delay the decision to deinstitutionalize harmful
recommendation decisions. Considering that this strategy merely provides
more opportunity for the platform to confirm, and for the user to
inadvertently fall prey to, the very content that causes harm like mis- and
disinformation and addictive content, personalization tools effectively
provide little, if any, guarantee that similar types of content or content
creators will be filtered out. 225 Like a captive audience, end users risk
repeated exposure even when they realize the problematic nature of the type
of content they have been consuming.226
Fourth, end users must rely on speaker-based filtering in order to
impose any sort of categorical control over their recommendation decisions.
Besides YouTube’s “Not Interested” input, the “Don’t Recommend Channel”
input is the other way users may exact direct control over the content that
YouTube has curated for them. This input is speaker-based because it filters
out curated content based on who provides that content, not what is provided.
Although this tool allows users to impose some degree of categorical control
over the recommendation decisions they receive, it risks over- and underblocking content, since the user must choose among speakers (i.e., creators),
not speech (i.e., content) itself.
Facebook’s Feed illustrates this flaw in more detail. Facebook’s Feed
is a popular personalization algorithm that curates “status updates, photos,
videos, links, app activity and likes from people, Pages and groups that you
follow on Facebook.” 227 Facebook instructs that in order to control this
personalization algorithm, end users may prioritize, unfollow, reconnect, and
snooze Pages, people, and groups.228 Influencing how Facebook Feed ranks

223

Id.; see also Hau L. Lee & Christopher S. Tang, Modeling the Costs and Benefits of Delayed
Differentiation, 43 MGMT. SCI. 40, 46–47 (1997).
224
See Lee & Teng, supra note 223, at 48–49 (“One can obtain additional savings in inventory cost
if one can reverse a high-valued operation at an early stage with a low value-added operation at a later
stage.”).
225
See id. at 49; see also Google, Manage Your Recommendations, supra note 176 (“Your ‘Not
Interested’ and ‘Don’t recommend channel’ feedback may be used to tune your recommendations.”).
226
One need only look to the story of Caleb Cain and his continued exposure to and consumption of
far-right content even after he consciously decided to dig himself out of the culture.
227
Facebook, How Feed Works, supra note 23 (emphasis added).
228
Control What You See in Feed, FACEBOOK [hereinafter Facebook, Control What you See],
https://www.facebook.com/help/964154640320617/?helpref=hc_fnav [https://perma.cc/F8JA-H5L8].
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content is more indirect.229 The ranking considers the end user’s quality and
frequency of engagement with types of posts (e.g., videos), Pages, people,
and groups.230 It also considers factors that are not in the end user’s control,
namely post recency and the quality and frequency of the engagement of the
end user’s own social network.231
Yet, these tools are somewhat crude. To exact direct control on
Facebook, the end user must largely filter by speakers. 232 According to
Facebook, end users must prioritize, unfollow, reconnect, and snooze content
creators to exert some influence or control over Feed.233 Thus, since Feed
curates problematic content based on the activity of the end user’s own social
network,234 an end user must choose to unfollow or demote a member of their
own social network to exact some degree of categorical control over
problematic recommendation decisions.
Additionally, just as friends on Facebook are important to the end user,
groups also improve an end user’s experience, cultivating trust among users
based on shared traits or interests.235 Yet, since these groups are susceptible
to the spread and amplification of disinformation,236 end users would have to
leave to directly control any problematic recommendation decisions arising
from a group. Granted, an end user could merely ignore or demote
problematic content pulled from their social network or their groups to
influence the recommendations they receive; yet as explained above, the end
user would risk continued exposure to harmful, injurious, or false content
curated by Facebook. Plus, this control must wrestle with curation decisions
that pull from a vast sea of similar content. In sum, on Facebook, the most
powerful, though crude, way to exert control over recommendation decisions
is through speakers, not content.

229
Facebook describes its Feed ranking as providing “a personalized and diverse stream of posts
from the people, news sources, businesses and communities you’ve connected with on Facebook.”
Facebook, How Feed Works, supra note 23. Facebook states that this ranking helps end users “connect
people to the posts that matter to them most.” Id.
230
Id.
231
Id.
232
Pages, people, and groups on Facebook are analogous to channels on YouTube, since they provide
content which the personalization algorithm pulls to render its recommendation decisions.
233
See Facebook, How Feed Works, supra note 23 (explaining “[w]hat influences the order of posts
in my Facebook feed”).
234
See id. (explaining “[W]hat kinds of posts will I see in Feed on Facebook”); Facebook, Control
What You See, supra note 228 (listing the “following options to adjust your Feed preferences:” favoriting,
unfollowing, reconnecting, snoozing, and reacting to content and content creators).
235
All Things Considered, supra note 107.
236
Id. (“Facebook groups are ripe targets for bad actors, for people who want to spread misleading,
wrong or dangerous information.”).
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Some platforms allow users to control their exposure by the broad
category of sensitive or offensive content. Twitter allows users to place a
warning on sensitive material before exposure. 237 YouTube provides a
Restricted Mode that “use[s] many signals—such as video title, description,
metadata, Community Guidelines reviews, and age-restrictions—to identify
and filter out potentially mature content.”238 Although these tools provide for
some categorical content-based control in countering a platform’s
recommendation decisions, users may tend to fear the lack of control and
possible over- and under-blocking. Thus, these broad categorical controls
create a chilling effect on user personalization.
B. Achieving Adequate Personalization Tools
The problem is clear. The predominant personalization tools available
to end users (1) require exposure before an end user can exert control, (2)
confer a woefully limited level of control over content-filtering, (3) situate
user input as merely user preference, and (4) largely depend on speakerbased filtering for a crude kind of categorical control. What are platforms
and policymakers to do about these deficiencies? Structured by four wellknown regulatory modalities, Section IV.B will analyze proposals for
platforms, policymakers, and scholars to consider.
1. Architecture
From an architectural perspective, personalization tools should address
these four shortcomings. A natural solution would be to allow users to filter
out content by type (e.g., conspiracy theory) or by characteristics (e.g.,
profanity, sexual content) before end user exposure. Platforms have already
acknowledged their ability to filter out and target different types of
problematic content, such as conspiracy theories,239 offensive materials,240
and even fake news and disinformants.241 A granular ex ante content-based
filtering system would allow users to consciously block false, addictive, and
other problematic content with a far greater sweep than currently available.
However, more importantly, this standard of end user personalization would
allow users to prevent recommendation decisions from exploiting their

237

How To Control Your Twitter Experience, TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/safety-andsecurity/control-your-twitter-experience [https://perma.cc/2QS2-DMJE].
238
Turn
Restricted
Mode
On
or
Off
on
YouTube,
YOUTUBE,
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/174084?hl=en [https://perma.cc/77S2-LSFU].
239
See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
240
See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
241
Samples, supra note 124 (reporting that Facebook is using machine learning to identify and
remove fake accounts); see also Manjoo, supra note 71 (reporting that Facebook opted to mark
misinformation as disputed).
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receptiveness to problematic content like mis- and disinformation and
addictive content.
Relatedly, platforms could make their personalization tools more
prominent or striking. 242 On YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter, the
personalization tools are hidden behind three small monochrome dots in
vertical or horizontal formation.243 Further, pressing these small dots also
presents an array of tools, some of which can be unrelated to end user
personalization. Despite being an industry standard, this method of
presentation can be hard to notice and confusing to use, especially for the
less-technologically inclined. Therefore, to raise end user awareness for
personalization tools, platforms should consider implementing more
intuitive or striking product designs, or de-cluttering menus where
personalization tools reside. (Perhaps swiping left to reject misinformation,
instead of a “Not Interested” input buried in a little menu behind three grey
dots.)
Interestingly, platforms have recently implemented prominent
information panels for certain types of problematic content.244 These panels
appear when a particular piece of content touches on topics prone to mis- and
disinformation, such as election fraud claims, the COVID-19 pandemic, and
even the moon landing. 245 Although these panels probably help curb the
harmful effects of mis- and disinformation by providing valuable
corroborating or opposing third-party viewpoints, these panels may still risk
users glossing over them due to their density and unattractive design. More
importantly, these panels work only after the user is already drawn into some
particular piece of content. Thus, they allow recommendation decisions to
succeed and leave the hard work of scrutinizing the information on the back
end. Further, since mis- and disinformation evokes emotional responses and
users tend to be less receptive to opposing viewpoints after exposure, these
242
Cf. Russell Feingold, Luciana Herman, Jacob Finkel, Steven Jiang, Mufan Luo, Rebecca Mears,
Danaë Metaxa-Kakavouli, Camille Peeples, Brendan Sasso, Arjun Shenoy, Vincent Sheu & Nicolás
Torres-Echeverry, Fake News and Misinformation: The Roles of the Nation’s Digital Newsstands,
Facebook, Google, Twitter, and Reddit, STAN. L. SCH. L. & POL’Y LAB 12–14 (2017), (generally
recommending major platforms to enhance the prominence of their tools).
243
Remove
Recommended
Content
from
Home,
YOUTUBE,
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/6125535?hl=en&ref_topic=9257501&co=GENIE.Platform
%3DDesktop&oco=1 [https://perma.cc/Q26E-JKAR]; How Do I Hide a Post That Appears in My
Facebook
Feed?,
FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/help/268028706671439?ref=ccs
[https://perma.cc/S8BT-AHAV]; How To Mute Accounts on Twitter and What Happens After Muting,
TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/using-twitter/twitter-mute [https://perma.cc/K4ES-FQYZ].
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E.g.,
Information
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Giving
Topical
Context,
GOOGLE,
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/9004474?hl=en
[https://perma.cc/N7YW-Q3CV]
(explaining that these panels appear regardless of “what opinions or perspectives are expressed in a video”
and provide independently-sourced background information).
245
Id.
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information panels may not prove effective, like slapping on an ugly BandAid to cure a broken bone. The architecture-based solution articulated above
is superior because it focuses on combating problematic recommendation
decisions themselves and allows users to counter the problematic content
before exposure.
2. Law
Policymakers could consider directly requiring platforms to follow the
standard of personalization tools proposed above. The academic and
legislative focus has been on content moderation, so there is little direct law
implicating content personalization. 246 As a result, a regulation on
personalization tools has not yet been attempted. However, such a regulation
would inevitably present difficult First Amendment hurdles. In this section,
although I do not attempt to resolve those issues, I argue that a direct
regulatory approach could be viable upon passing intermediate scrutiny.
To start, case law on filtering regulations suggests that Congress could,
and should, consider regulating and promoting personalization tools. In
Ashcroft v. ACLU, 247 the Supreme Court suggested that Congress should
directly promote filtering technology.248
One argument to the contrary is worth mentioning—the argument that
filtering software is not an available alternative because Congress may not
require it to be used. That argument carries little weight, because Congress
undoubtedly may act to encourage the use of filters. We have held that
Congress can give strong incentives to schools and libraries to use them. It
could also take steps to promote their development by industry, and their use
by parents.249
Although the Court did not expressly certify filtering as a regulatory
means, the Court clearly indicated a preference for content filtering over
content removal under the First Amendment. Since filtering technology
encompasses algorithms that maneuver the user through hosted content, the
Court’s approval logically extends to personalization tools as well.250
246
See, e.g., Counterspeech, DANGEROUS SPEECH PROJECT, https://dangerousspeech.org/counters
peech/ [https://perma.cc/AHV9-5NJM] (“Continued study of counterspeech is essential, especially as
censorship and takedown proliferate as methods of regulating online speech.”).
247
542 U.S. 656 (2004).
248
Id. at 669.
249
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
250
In recent years, the legislature has been less approving of consumer choice over platform
decisions. In 2016, the Federal Communication Commission (FCC) passed a rule that required
telecommunication carriers to provide their customers with participatory tools to grant or deny the carriers’
use of their sensitive personal information for marketing and other purposes. Protecting the Privacy of
Customers of Broadband and Other Telecommunications Services, 81 Fed. Reg. 87274 (Dec. 2, 2016).
Yet, Congress took swift action to disapprove of and nullify the rule. See Joint Resolution, Pub. L. No.
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Despite the Court’s apparent enthusiasm for filtering technology,
regulations on personalization tools must still pass muster under the First
Amendment. The first question in this analysis is whether the proposed
regulation targets or burdens the platform’s speech.251 A regulation requiring
platforms to implement the user personalization standard described above
would not impose any content- or viewpoint-based restriction on speech. The
proposed regulation would be generally applicable because it would merely
impose content-filtering capabilities, not content filtering itself. In other
words, it will merely require additional filters that will allow users to make
more choices over the content filtering they experience on the platform.
However, the proposed regulation would likely be restricting platforms’
right to free speech by placing an incidental burden on its right to produce
certain recommendation decisions for end users.252 In today’s legal landscape,
platforms have free reign to render any recommendation decisions for its end
users. Compliance with the proposed regulatory standard could suppress vast
swathes of decisions that would otherwise be available. Given this potential
effect, it may even chill platforms’ recommendation production, since
platforms could suppress their production in fear of over-triggering end user
personalization. Thus, given the potential impact on recommendation
decisions, intermediate scrutiny would probably apply such that courts
would require the government to show that the regulation is “no greater than
is essential” to support an important government interest. 253 Because
intermediate scrutiny does not necessarily spell the death of a well-tailored
regulation, legislators may find a viable path toward regulating end user
personalization to achieve the promise of counterspeech.
Beyond the platform’s right to render recommendation decisions,
several other speech-related interests converge when analyzing the viability
of a proposed regulation on end user personalization. A platform’s right to
communicate and to editorialize compete with the end user’s “very basic
115-22, 131 Stat. 88 (2017). However, the past three years have seen heightened appetite for regulating
platforms such that consumer choice may seem more appealing to Congress.
251
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 375, 376 (1968) (noting first “that the [challenged statute]
plainly does not abridge free speech on its face”).
252
Cf. United States v. Am. Library Assoc., 539 U.S. 194 (2003) (indicating that a statute which
conditions funding on public libraries’ use of filtering software interferes with the libraries’ right to
editorialize their collection as well as the patron’s right to receive information).
253
See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 661–62 (1994) (applying intermediate scrutiny
for “content-neutral restrictions that impose an incidental burden on speech”). Several dimensions of
recommendation decisions further justify a lower level of scrutiny than strict scrutiny, including their
private nature, see supra Section I.C; commercial purpose, see Sofia Grafanaki, Platforms, the First
Amendment and Online Speech: Regulating the Filters, 39 PACE L. REV. 111, 151 (2018); and their
largely mathematical or mechanical, rather than artistic or creative, production process, see Wu, Machine
Speech, supra note 81, at 1533.
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right to be free from sights, sounds, and tangible matter [they] do not want”
and their right to reply. 254 Two court cases illustrate why this interest
competition matters. The first is Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Department.255 In
Rowan, the Supreme Court prioritized a statutory right to block unsolicited
mail, despite its impact on advertisers’ fundamental right to communicate.
The Court held that a statute giving homeowners a right to provide notice
against, reject, and filter out postal solicitations did not violate the First
Amendment because the privacy of the home is sacred and the regulation
empowered homeowners to target speech, rather than “vesting the power to
make any discretionary evaluation of the material in a governmental
official.”256 The Court also believed that holding otherwise would violate the
homeowner’s autonomy, stating the following:
“[It] would make hardly more sense than to say that a radio or television viewer
may not twist the dial to cut off an offensive or boring communication and thus
bar its entering his home.”257

In Tornillo, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the speaker’s autonomy
rather than the audience’s right to reply. 258 In a unanimous decision, the
Court found that a state statute that conferred to political candidates a right
to reply to material critical to their candidacy in local newspapers violated
the First Amendment. 259 The statute imposed a content-based penalty for
material that was critical of political candidates, since compliance required
newspapers to absorb additional costs in printing, composing, and
publication space, thereby also producing a chilling effect on political
controversy, since newspapers would probably rather avoid the material
altogether than absorb the costs imposed by a right to reply.260 The Court
declared, even if no additional costs were imposed, the statute constituted an
impermissible “intrusion into the function of editors,” who are entitled to

254
Compare Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (weighing the
newspaper’s right to editorialize with a politician’s right to reply to critical material), with Rowan v. U.S.
Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 736 (1970) (weighing the advertiser’s right to communicate unsolicited
mail with the homeowner’s right to block such mail). Although personalization tools do not allow end
users to publicly reply to critical material of themselves through an intermediary, as usually contemplated,
these tools do allow end users to respond to the platform’s recommendation decisions with their own
edits. Cf. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258 (assessing a politician’s statutory right to reply to critical material).
See generally Patrick M. Garry, The Flip Side of the First Amendment: A Right to Filter, 2004 MICH. ST.
L. REV. 57, 69 (2004) (characterizing user filtering as user editing).
255
397 U.S. 728 (1970).
256
Id. at 737–38.
257
See id. at 737.
258
Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258.
259
Id. at 247, 258.
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Id. at 256–57.
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make decisions as to its publication’s size and content, as well as its
treatment of certain public issues and officials.261
On its face, platform-user personalization seems more similar to the
expressive dynamic in Rowan than in Tornillo. Like the choice to reject
unsolicited mail in Rowan, personalization tools reflect the choice of the user
to reject the platform’s invasive recommendation decisions. Although
recommendation decisions, unlike junk mail, are an integral part to a
consented, privatized service,262 their largely commercial purpose263 as well
as their practical invisibility in operation and technical derivation264 renders
these decisions analogous to the unsolicited, commercial junk mail at issue
in Rowan.
One difference worth its weight is that Rowan was concerned with
maintaining the privacy of the home rather than the privacy of a commercial
service. Yet, social media has become an integral part of everyday life. In
fact, social media is more invasive than traditional print media and even
broadcast media for many reasons. One reason is because it remains as
accessible as “modern cell phones.”265 Thus, under Rowan, the asserted right
of a platform in rendering recommendation decisions, like the asserted right
of mailers in delivering unwanted mail to the home, should “stop[] at the
outer boundary of every person’s domain.”266 At the very least, the similarity
between the expressive dynamic in Rowan and the one at issue here should
call into question whether communicating unwanted recommendation
decisions should constitutionally trump the end user’s ability to provide
notice against, reject, and filter out such communications.
Under Tornillo, however, the platform’s editorial right in rendering
recommendation decisions could trump the user’s right to provide
personalization inputs. However, in the personalization context, Tornillo
does not fit as well as Rowan. The assumption in Tornillo is that the
newspaper’s editorial rights and the politicians’ right to reply are mutually
exclusive.267 Thus, even though politicians’ right to reply benefited readers
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Id. at 258.
See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
263
See supra Section I.B; see also Grafanaki, supra note 253, at 151 (advocating that personalization
algorithms produce commercial speech).
264
See, e.g., Cohen, Platform Economy, supra note 63, at 140 (“Additionally, the intentional
‘invisibleness’ of the algorithm further complicates how users can gain awareness of how to read their
feeds and act more intentionally.”).
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Modern cells phones “are now such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life that the proverbial
visitor from Mars might conclude they were an important feature of human anatomy.” Riley v. California,
573 U.S. 373, 385 (2014).
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and the public at large through robust discourse, the direct result would have
been the newspaper’s lost space, profits, and journalistic autonomy over its
own publication. In contrast to editorial decision in the print media context,
recommendation decisions depend in large part on individual user inputs
(data and personalization). 268 Further, unlike newspapers, platforms
generally fulfill their editorial function in rendering recommendation
decisions by curating, not creating, a voluminous mass of content.
Personalization is also a private dynamic—one between the platform and the
individual end user. Whereas editing in mass media context gives the editor
wide expressive impact, the same cannot be said about curating in digital
media context. The foregoing distinctions emphasize that a platform’s
editorial decisions depend greatly on user taste, while newspapers must
allocate more weight to other considerations. Accordingly, under Tornillo, a
user’s right to reply should receive more weight relative to a platform’s right
to editorialize than did a politician’s right to reply relative to a newspaper’s
right to editorialize. In any case, the right to editorialize may not be the death
knell to a statutory right to reply in the platform-user personalization context
as it was in the newspaper-politician mass media context.
In sum, a regulation targeting end user personalization is viable because
intermediate scrutiny would likely apply. Further, Rowan provides an
argument that an end user’s right to reject recommendation decisions trumps
the platform’s right to impose them. Although Tornillo held that a
newspaper’s right to editorialize trumps a politician’s right to reply, Tornillo
is sufficiently distinguishable in the personalization context.
3. Markets
Amending Section 230 to provide immunity upon implementing a
“counterspeech” standard of end user personalization tools may be fruitful.
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 provides platforms
immunity from civil liability based on the hosting and removal of third-party
content in certain circumstances.269 Amending Section 230 has wide support
from members from both sides of the aisle. Following this trend, one
proposal could be to give platforms “Good Samaritan” immunity only if they
implement a set of end user personalization tools to meet the standard
identified above. For example, as recent as June 2020, the Department of
Justice suggested
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See supra Section I.B.
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“a provision requiring an interactive computer service to have easy and apparent
mechanism for users to flag unlawful content in order to benefit from Section
230 immunity. The mechanism should be reasonable based on the size and
nature of the interactive computer service.”270

In this way, policymakers could incentivize platforms to pursue an
adequate set of personalization tools. As explained above, Ashcroft signaled
approval for such a regulatory scheme under First Amendment doctrine.271
To the extent that the constitutionality of conditioning immunity and
conditioning funding turn on the same free speech issue, United States v.
American Library Association272 provides a promising analog. The Supreme
Court found that public libraries’ use of content filtering software as a
condition for federal funding is consistent with their First Amendment rights
and that of their patrons.273 The Children’s Internet Protection Act (“CIPA”)
required public libraries to install content-filtering software that blocks
access to material that would be harmful to minors in order to receive federal
assistance for Internet access and computer hardware. 274 To determine
whether CIPA’s content-filtering provisions were facially constitutional, the
Supreme Court had to analyze whether compliance induced public libraries
to violate the First Amendment rights of their patrons to receive protected
material and whether CIPA imposed an unconstitutional forfeiture of public
libraries’ right to curate their collection.275
As for the first issue, the Supreme Court reasoned that public libraries’
decisions to source and collect materials was not subject to heightened
scrutiny because libraries had editorial discretion in deciding which content
they procured.276 Further, given the magnitude of content on the Internet,
because a library cannot make individualized editorial judgments for all the
content available on their computers, “it is entirely reasonable for public
libraries to reject that approach and instead exclude certain categories of
content.” 277 The Court also addressed the natural tendency for filtering
technology to over- and under-block constitutionally protected speech.
Though filtering technology could erroneously block permissible material
while impermissible material could scrape by, the addressability of the
filtering system—the ability for patrons to easily “ask a librarian to unblock

270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277

Id. at 18.
See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
539 U.S. 194 (2003).
Id. at 214.
Id. at 201.
See id. at 203.
Id. at 208.
Id. at 195.

83

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

[content] or (at least in the case of adults) disable the filter”—convinced the
Court that the provision did not violate the speech rights of their patrons.278
As for the second issue, the Court declared that even if CIPA provided
libraries with an “unconstitutional condition” claim, requiring libraries to
surrender their right to curate content for their patrons in exchange for federal
funding, the Constitution entitled Congress to define the limits of its federal
funding programs. 279 To the extent that public libraries have traditionally
excluded the explicit material CIPA had proscribed and that CIPA’s filtering
provision helped carry out the purpose of the funding, Congress had full
authority to require filtering for federal funding.280
Conditioning some benefit, whether that be federal funding or
immunity, on compliance with implementing a standard of personalization
tools would implicate the same issues and conclusions. For not only are
personalization tools merely a form of filtering, but also the additional
element of user control over the filters—a distinctive difference between the
proposal here and the statute in American Library Association—is merely a
stronger version of the very dimension the Court found attractive about
CIPA’s approach: users have discretion to block or unblock material. Thus,
American Library Association illustrates that the First Amendment poses
little threat to an indirect approach like amending Section 230 to condition
immunity on compliance with a standard of filtering.
4. Social Norms
Platforms and policymakers should also consider raising awareness
about end user personalization tools. Tutorials on how to use personalization
tools would go a long way in establishing awareness for user control over
the platform’s recommendation decisions. Although educational campaigns
have proven to be a modest step towards changing consumer behavior, they
can and have played an important role in establishing new social norms. Yet,
rather than a broad education campaign, platforms and policymakers
themselves have the ability to provide platform-specific tutorials on how end
users might take advantage of the personalization tools at their disposal. 281
A platform-specific approach would likely prove more useful and effective
278
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than a broad campaign towards raising public awareness for personalization
tools, since users would benefit from an explanation of which tools are
available on a platform, what they do, and where they can find them.
More broadly, decreasing user’s susceptibility to recommendation
decisions through media literacy can help mitigate the effects of the
algorithm-based spread of problematic content like mis- and disinformation
and addictive content. Researchers have called for educators to teach
skepticism when consuming content. 282 This approach can help lower
instances of problematic recommendation decisions because end users
would be able to not only recognize decisions that exploit their emotions but
also alter their own engagement patterns so as to gradually inform the
personalization algorithm towards different—healthier—curation decisions.
V. CONCLUSION
Why should policymakers bother with regulating towards more
powerful end user personalization tools when platforms are trending towards
more sophisticated personalization systems anyways? Policymakers could
just do nothing. However, platforms constitute some of the most important
places for speech, and personalization algorithms are the primary means with
which users find information. Yet, since these algorithms are a function of
the practical, commercial purposes of the platforms, they use the very same
drivers that make problematic content so compelling. Therefore, the
increasing spread of mis- and disinformation and addictive content is directly
related to the increasing roles personalization algorithms and
recommendation decisions play in today’s information society.
Thus, personalization tools help users engage in expressive combat
against recommendation decisions spreading problematic content.
Recognizing end user personalization as a means of providing effective
counterspeech against such influential yet often-overlooked platform speech
will help shift the balance of expressive power from platforms to users. With
largely ex post, contained, preferential (indirect), and speaker-based control
over a platform’s recommendation decisions, end users currently lack a
robust ex ante content-filtering system that would empower users to
participate and avoid content like mis- and disinformation or addictive
content. Although the current personalization tools are a great start, the
current system lacks such basics that it cannot achieve the promise of
counterspeech, the most natural and speech-protective way to combat
282
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problematic speech. Improving personalization tools—that is, improving
participatory capabilities—will give our democracy a healthier and more
sustainable digital public sphere.
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